商业银行公司治理:一个基于银行业特征的理论分析被引量：106

Corporate Governance of Commercial Banks: A Theoretical Analysis Based on the Characters of Banking Industry

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摘要本文从银行业的行业特征出发,分析了银行资本结构的特殊性、资产交易的非透明性和严格管制等三个典型特征对商业银行公司治理机制的影响,探讨了商业银行公司治理的特征。分析的结果表明,由于行业特征的影响,商业银行公司治理所要解决的主要代理问题是股东与债权人、股东与监管者之间的利益冲突;在商业银行的公司治理机制中,外部治理的作用非常有限,内部治理机制是其核心。在内部治理中,董事会发挥着重要的作用;现金补偿式的低报酬—业绩敏感性管理层报酬补偿机制可能更为有效。银行管制和监管作为外部治理的替代机制在商业银行公司治理中发挥着保护存款人和社会公众利益的作用,但管制和监管并非有利于商业银行公司治理效率的提高。 Based on the characters of banking industry, this paper analyses the influences of banks.capital structure, opaqueness of bank assets transactions, and bank supervisions on the corporate governance mechanisms of commercial banks. The paper argues that the interests conflicts between shareholders and debtholders, and the interest conflicts between shareholders and regulators are the main agency problems in the corporate governance of banks. The study shows that internal governance mechanism is more important than external governance mechanisms, and top- management compensation with low pay- performance sensitivity, such as cash compensation, may be more effective than that with high pay - performance sensitivity, and as a substitute of external governance force, bank regulation and supervision protect the interests of depositors and the public, but its may be ineffective in improving the governance of commercial banks.

作者潘敏

机构地区武汉大学商学院

出处《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第3期37-47,共11页 Journal of Financial Research

基金国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:70372071)的资助。

关键词商业银行公司治理行业特征 commercial banks corporate governance industrial characteristics

分类号 F832.2 [经济管理—金融学]

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