摘要
国有商业银行在我国经济转轨过程中起到了重要作用,同时自身也积累了大量不良贷款,这一积累过程恰恰反映出我国存在着不良贷款处置迟缓现象。本文根据中国国有商业银行和国有企业的转型特征,基于博弈论的分析框架建立了一个包括政府—企业—银行的三部门模型,采用新政治经济学的分析范式对不良贷款在我国国有商业银行体系中的大量积累且必然是内生性处置迟缓的事实进行了阐释,揭示了银行行为背后的深刻政治经济动因。
China＇ s state- owned banks have played very important role in the process economic transition, while has accumulated a lot of non - performance loans, which shows that there is a liquidation delay in the banking system. In term of the transitional features of the Stated- owned commercial banks and enterprises in China, the paper builds a two- period model including households,firms and banks to explain the fact that the non - performance loan is endogenous and the liquidation action of it must be delayed from the view of new political economy, and the political economy determinant of the banks＇ action.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第3期23-30,共8页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目
项目号:05JA790039。
关键词
不良贷款
经济转型
新政治经济学
non- performance loan, economic transition, new political economy
