摘要
运用进化博弈理论,构造证券交易者进化博弈模型,模拟市场中理性交易者与噪声交易者相互转换的过程,说明二者之间存在动态均衡,这种均衡受到交易者对证券收益的预期与噪声交易风险的影响。
This paper builds up an evolutionary game model of the trade behavior of securities investors based on the evolutionary game theory, simulates the process of the mutual conversion between rational traders and noise traders, and proves its dynamic equilibrium. This kind of equilibrium is affected by the traders＇ expected return of assets and noise trade risk.
出处
《金融理论与实践》
北大核心
2006年第4期7-9,共3页
Financial Theory and Practice
关键词
进化博弈
理性交易
噪声交易
evolutionary game
rational trading
noise trading
