期刊文献+
任意字段
题名或关键词
题名
关键词
文摘
作者
第一作者
机构
刊名
分类号
参考文献
作者简介
基金资助
栏目信息

基于行为金融学的公司股利支付 被引量：3

Companies' Pay Dividend Based on Behavior Finance Theory
在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 经典理性框架下的金融理论不能够完全回答公司为什么支付股利的问题,而行为金融学在放松了投资者、管理者理性的假设之后,对这个问题做出了较好的解释。行为金融学理论认为,自我控制的需要、后悔厌恶心理以及心理账户的原因,使得投资者偏好现金股利而不是资本收益;而对管理者来说,一方面为了迎合投资者的心理,另一方面由于其本身的后悔厌恶心理,也倾向于支付现金股利。 Financial theory of classical rational frame can not answer the reason why companies pay dividend completely. As behavior finance relaxes the assumption that investors, administrators are rational, it can make better explanation to the problem from serf-control, regret aversion, mental account theory. The paper reviews the explanation that the financial theory of the classics may produce problems that make the company pay dividend but have its deficiency, and then expound the answer of behavior finance to this problem.
作者 郭强
机构地区 西北大学经济管理学院
出处 《长安大学学报（社会科学版）》 2006年第1期64-67,共4页 Journal of Chang'an University(Social Science Edition)
关键词 应用经济学 金融学 公司金融 现金股利 心理账户 applied economics financial science company finance cash dividend mental accounting
分类号 F421.36 [经济管理—产业经济]
  • 相关文献

参考文献6

  • 1[1]Shefrin H M,Statman M.Explaining Investor Preference for Cash Dividends[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984(13):253-282.
  • 2黄树青.行为金融学与数理金融学论争[J].经济学动态,2002(1):60-65. 被引量：30
  • 3[4]Frankfurter G M,Lane W R.The Rationality of Dividends[J].International Review of Financial Analysis,2002,11(1):115-129.
  • 4王涛,李志军.利益相关者理论的缺陷与企业市场价值观点[J].长安大学学报（社会科学版）,2005,7(4):31-34. 被引量：10
  • 5[7]Thaler R H,Shefrin H M.An Economic Theory of Self Control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1981(89):392-410.
  • 6[8]Kahneman D,Tversky A.An Analysis of Decision Making under Risk[J].Econometriea,1979,47 (2):263-291.

二级参考文献35

  • 1[1]Dodd E M.For whom are corporate managers trustees?[J].Harvard Law Review,1932,(45):1145-1143.
  • 2[2]Freeman R E.Strategic management:a stakeholder approach[M].Boston:Pitma Press,1984.
  • 3[3]Clarkson M A.Stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social performance[J].Academy of Management Review,1995,(20):92-117.
  • 4[4]Donaldson T,Preston L.The stakeholder theory of corporation:concepts,evidence,and implications[J ].Academy of Management Review,1995,(20):63-91.
  • 5[5]Mitchell A,Wood D.Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience:defining the principle of who and what really counts[J].Academy of Management Review,1997,22(4):853-866.
  • 6[6]Blair M M.Ownership and control:rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first century[M].Washington:Brookings Institute Press,1995.
  • 7[7]Blair M M.Wealth creation and wealth sharing:a colloquium on corporate governance and investments in human capital[M].Washington:Brookings Institute Press,1996.
  • 8[10]Berman S L,Wicks A C,Kotha S,Jones T M.Does stakeholder orientation matter? the relationship between stakeholder management models and firm financial performance[J].Academy of Management Review,1999,(42):485-506.
  • 9[11]Jensen M C.Value maximization,stakeholder theory and the corporate objective function[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 2001,(14):8-21.
  • 10Black, Fischer. 1986. "Noise. "Journal of Finance. vol.41, No.3,July :529 - 543.

共引文献38

同被引文献14

引证文献3

二级引证文献5

长安大学学报（社会科学版）
2006年 第1期

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部