摘要
将n人非合作对策的Nash平衡点的稳定性推广到纯策略集是不具有凸性的一般度量空间,并且去掉了支付函数的凸性,在更广泛的范围内证明了满足一定条件的n人非合作对策大多数(在Baire范畴意义)是稳定的.
The stability of n-person noncooperative games is generalized to the general metric space which have no convexity, as well as the convexity of the payoffs is omitted. In wider range, we prove that most of the games （ in the sense of Baire Category） are stable.
出处
《贵州大学学报（自然科学版）》
2006年第1期26-30,共5页
Journal of Guizhou University:Natural Sciences
关键词
NASH平衡点
本质平衡点
本质对策
Nash equilibrium points
essential equilibrium points
essential game
