摘要
在传统信号理论基础上,本文建立了一个用于解释股票市场上的圈钱偏好与IPO定价问题的模型。模型主要基于一个新的假设———发行者对从一级和二级市场得到的资金总额具有特定的偏好,并且发行者出于某种考虑将保留一定股份作为非流通股。本文研究了该假设下,如果投资者自始至终无法知道项目的真实价值,而只能根据发行份额和折价程度来判断项目的真实情况时的IPO定价问题。发行者的这种偏好的实际意义,就是通常所说的圈钱偏好。
With traditional signal theories, we propose a model to explain the phenomenon of money preference in the pricing of IPOs. The model is mainly based on the new hypothesis： The issuers have a preference for the whole amount received from the market, and for certain reasons they will retain some share of stocks. Models about the pricing of IPOs are given when the investors have no idea about the true value of the project. It is consistent with the money preference in practice.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2006年第1期88-91,共4页
Operations Research and Management Science
关键词
金融学
圈钱偏好
信号模型
IPO
非流通股
定价
finance
money preference
signal models
IPO
nonnegotiable stocks
pricing
