摘要
西方传统区位理论和区域经济学,都没有很好地将政区竞争与厂商区位选择联系起来进行考虑。中国作为一个大国,地方政府之间的政区竞争将影响厂商的区位选择。本文主要探讨政区竞争导致的地方政府在拓展政策和领导人能力方面的差异化、差异性条件下厂商的跨区域区位选择以及这种选择的效率效应。
The traditional occidental zone theory and zone economics did not match competition of administrative zones and selection of supplier location. As a power, competition of administrative zones among local governments will necessarily affect the selection of supplier location. The paper mainly discusses the diversity of expansion policy and leader＇ s ability, selection of supplier location eaused by differences.
出处
《商业经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第2期48-54,共7页
Journal of Business Economics
关键词
区位理论
自然区位
差异性政府
拓展政策
zone theory
natural location
diversified government
expansion policy
