摘要
本文讨论反倾销对于出口企业除了维护国内市场之外的另一用途：抑制外来的反倾销起诉。构建一个两国垄断企业在两个分割的市场上竞争的倾销模型，加入反倾销起诉成本和胜诉几率两个重要概念，发展成为一期反倾销博弈模型，再拓展到各方采用报复性战略的无限重复博弈。得出结论，在“报复性反倾销”的威慑作用下，两国产业之间可能达成互不发起反倾销起诉的合作性均衡。
This paper shows that a second purpose of AD for exporting firms is to deter further use of AD. Retaliatory AD is a strategic action to punish trading partners who have used AD. We first build a dumping model in which two monopolistic firms compete with each other respectively in two dividing markets, and frame it into a one-period AD game taking into consideration the AD filing cost and AD duty probability. Then the model is extended into an infinitely repeated game. We come to the conclusion that retaliatory AD can strategically deter further use of AD filing and lead to a cooperative outcome.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
2005年第B10期189-202,共14页
China Economic Quarterly
