摘要
在我国国资管理与国企改革轰轰烈烈进行、国有资本出资者身份日益统一集中于各级国资委的时代背景下,出资者与经营者的责任边界日渐明晰,委托人对代理人的监管活动越来越深、越来越细。出资者监管融通了相关主体之间的经济利益、心理活动和管理协调等纷繁复杂的活动。本文以博弈论视角来阐述监管领域的几个主要博弈现象,试图从理性、机理上探寻国资监管之道。
The management of state-own assets （SOA） and reformation of state-owned enterprises （SOE） is in the high gear. The new establishing SOA supervision and administration commission performs much more responsibility as the investor. Under this background, the investor and operator＇s responsibility border is clear day by day, principals are imposing increasing supervision and administration over the agents. Investor supervision and administration reconciles lots of complicated activities, such as economic benefits , psychological activities and management coordination of related parties , which runs following the game theory.
This essay analyses and comments on several mainly game phenomenon happening around the operators in the supervision and administration field from the prospective of game theory , attempts to seek a reasonable and mechanical way to supervise and administrate the state-run assets.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第1期80-85,共6页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
关键词
出资监管
几个问题
博弈分析
Investor supervision and administration Basic Problems Game-analyzing
