摘要
在我国财政分权改革中,地方政府逐渐成为相对独立的公共实体。由于我国现行体制下,上级政府对下级政府、中央政府对地方政府的隐性财政担保关系缺乏有效的风险约束机制,引致了地方财政运行中道德风险蔓延,提高了我国的财政风险。防范地方政府道德风险需构建风险约束机制,并在改革进程中进一步完善财政管理体制。
During the reform of fiscal decentralization in our country, local governments turn to relatively independent public sector gradually. In our existing institutional arrangements, as the implicit guarantees taken by central government suffer from the problem of incentive incompatibility, the resulting moral hazards will lead to even higher fiscal risks. On the precaution of moral hazards in local governments, we should set up risk-control mechanism and perfect the existing fiscal system.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第1期8-13,共6页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
