摘要
在讨论了一次博弈模型和流速均衡解析解的基础上,对基于无限重复博弈模型的流速与拥塞控制行为进行了研究.提出了重复和无限重复流速与拥塞控制博弈模型,论证了重复博弈NEP的存在性和最优性,讨论了重复博弈中贴现因子的意义;通过2个无限重复流速控制博弈的实例(2个端系统和N个端系统),介绍了在非合作的流速与拥塞控制中规范(约束)端系统的行为方法,以维护和实现整个流速与拥塞控制系统效用的最优.
After the one-shot game model and flow equilibrium solution are discussed, the behaviors of flow and congestion control based on infinite repeated game model further is studied. Subsequently, repeated and infinite repeated flow and congestion control game model is presented. The existence and optimization of the Nash equilibrium point is proved. The discount factor in repeated game is discussed. Finally, through two examples of repeated flow control game with two users and N users, this article explains how to regularize or restrict the users＇ behaviors in noncooperative flow and congestion control respectively to optimize the utility of whole system.
出处
《东南大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第6期853-857,共5页
Journal of Southeast University：Natural Science Edition
基金
国家重点基础研究发展计划(973计划)资助项目(2003CB314801)
高等学校博士学科点专项基金资助项目(20040286001)
