摘要
我国农信社体制的变迁与发展,是数十年来各种社会经济问题的集中反映,也是制度约束的必然结果,由此构成了中国农村信用社体制改革问题的艰巨性与复杂性。从利益博弈的角度分析,每一轮农信社体制的改革都将引发一场利益关系的博弈,博弈的均衡点就是此轮改革的结局。希望在农村信用社改革的框架之内解决农村金融服务体系的全部或大部分问题是不切实际的。
The evolution and development of China＇ s rurual credit cooperative regime is an intensive reflection of various social and economic problems in several decades, and is the inevitable result of institutional constraint, hence, making China＇ s rurual credit cooperative reformation problem arduous and complex. Analysizing from the prospect of interest game, each cycle of rurual credit cooperative reformation will cause a game of interest relationship, and the equilibrium spot of gaming is the result of each reformation cycle. It＇ s not realistic to hope all or most problems of rurual financial service system can be solved within the framework of rurual credit cooperative reformation.
出处
《河南金融管理干部学院学报》
2005年第5期42-45,共4页
Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres
关键词
农村信用社
利益博弈
制度安排
rurual credit cooperative
interest gaming
institutional arrangement
