经理人报酬与激励——理论与实务及我国当前实践的探讨被引量：8

Executive's Compensation and Incentive: A Review of Theory VS. Practice and Contemporary Situation in China

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摘要对经理人报酬组合构成、报酬政策制定以及经理人报酬衡量标准的研究文献进行了述评,通过对于经理人报酬与业绩、企业规模、股东财富以及其他相关因素实证研究的回顾,根据我国上市公司经理人报酬计划的现状,探讨了经理人员报酬激励方案的设计及其影响因素。 This article reviews the research literatures concerning executives＇s compensation structure, compensation policy and its measurement criteria. By reviewing the empirical research evidences that involve the relationship between executives＇s compensation vs performance, corporate size, shareholder＇ s wealth and other relevant factors, according to contemporary practice about CEO compensation plan in China＇s listed companies, we discussed the design and its influence factors that influencing executive＇s of an effective compensation and incentive scheme compensation plan.

作者刘海英

机构地区山东大学管理学院

出处《山东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》北大核心 2005年第5期84-90,共7页 Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

关键词经理人报酬激励净收益与股价报酬方案 executive＇s compensation incentive net income and share price compensation scheme

分类号 F272 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献27

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