摘要
本文分析了网络服务中带宽的类似公共产品使用和ISP与顾客间主从博弈,导致拥塞,接着证明基于流量的定价策略较之固定定价策略更能控制网络拥塞,随后在基于流量的定价策略下,分析了垄断的市场中社会总福利达不到最优,ISP间的竞争会增加顾客效用,最后指出社会总福利达到最优时的价格是一影子价格。
This paper analyzes the public goods in the network service sharing bandwidth, shows that the leader-follower game between users and ISP both result in congestion, and then verifies the usage-based pricing is more adaptable to controling the congestion than flat-rate pricing. Thus under usage-based pricing, in the monopoly market the maximum social welfare can＇t be accomplished; competitions between ISPs bring the improvement of users＇ utility; while the price under which the maximum social welfare is accomplished is a shadow price.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2005年第4期101-106,共6页
Operations Research and Management Science
