摘要
现有研究虽然从不同的角度解释了团体贷款能够获得成功的原因,但却忽略了团体贷款的利率普遍较高的事实。根据“信贷配给”理论,高利率会吸引高风险贷款者或使投资者的行为趋于冒险,那么团体贷款的高利率应该吸引高风险者或使投资者趋于冒险,从而导致低的还款率。但是为什么我们没有观察到高利率导致团体贷款的还款率恶化?本文对现有模型进行扩展后,证明了团体贷款下的高利率政策会产生一种遴选效果,从而导致团体贷款在高利率下走向成功。
The high repayment rate of group lending and its effects on fighting poverty have drawn the attention of many economists and policy makers. Most of these studies have not paid much attention to one important phenomenon - the high interest rate and high repayment rate coexists. According to the classic theory of credit rationing, high interest rates can only attract risky borrowers and drive borrowers prone to be more risky, so the repayment rate of group lending should be low rather than high. Why do we have not observed the high interest rate resulted in a low repayment rate and a failed group lending？ After having revised the current models, this paper finds an selection effect come from the high interest rate and explains that this effect makes group lending successful.
出处
《世界经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第8期60-66,80,共8页
The Journal of World Economy
基金
教育部重点基地课题"我国信用风险与信用体系研究"的阶段性成果
批准号:02JAZJD790005
