摘要
央行最后贷款人职能的确立已有200年的历史,但是传统的危机救助有可能带来道德风险并严重恶化央行的金融资源。首先不明确公布危机救助触发条件,使得央行在是否行使最后贷款人职能时相机抉择的“建设性模棱两可”越来越受到关注,本文从博弈论角度对建设性模棱两可的有效性、动态实施过程及其缺陷进行介绍,并探讨了中国“建设性模棱两可”型危机救助的初步框架。
LOLR has been established as one of the Central Bank＇s Obligation for 200 years, but the traditional bailingout financing to the banks may lead to moral hazards and therefore deteriorate the banking sector＇s stability. The constructive ambiguity, by bringing in the concept of the fulfillment of LOLR without ante-conditionality, gives the central bank some discretion. The paper discusses the dynamic procedure and the effectiveness of constructive ambiguity within game theory framework, finally, it suggests a new bailing-out framework for PBOC.
出处
《国际金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第7期37-43,共7页
Studies of International Finance
关键词
最后贷款人
建设性模棱两可
危机救助
隐含担保
Lender of Last Resort
Constructive Ambiguity
Bailing-out Projects
Implicit Guarantee.
