摘要
在文(I)基础上建立了两个有关生产者之间不完全竞争的均衡模型, 模型属于混合的线性互补问题(LCP),并用一个简单实例阐述它们的应用。这两个模型模拟双边合同型电力市场, 模型已包含了输电网拥堵的定价方法。这两个模型之间的区别在于, 其中一个模型是输电网节点之间不存在套利, 而另一个模型存在套利, 故后一个双边合同模型等同于电力库型电力市场的Cournot均衡模型。文中还给出了模型求解的软件系统流程, 并以一个简化的应用实例验证了本文给出的模型和方法的正确性和有效性。
This paper established two producer-equilibrium models of imperfect competition, which belong to the linear complementary problem(referred to as: LCP latter), based on our previous paper (I), and illustrates their application by a practical example. These two models simulate the bilateral contract power markets and include the pricing method of the transmission network congestion. The difference between these two models is that the first one has no arbitrage between the nodes in a transmission network whereas the second one has. The second model is equivalent to the poolco power market Cournot-equilibrium model. The software system flow of the models resolving is also given in this paper, and a simple application example is quoted to testify the correctness and validity of the models and methods.
出处
《现代电力》
2005年第2期86-90,共5页
Modern Electric Power
基金
国家自然科学基金项目 (70071009)
关键词
博弈论
“纳什-古诺”竞争
纳什均衡
电力市场
竞争
模型
game theory
Nash-Cournot competition
Nash\|equilibrium
competition of the power market
model
