摘要
逻辑哲学存在着两个基本的假设,第一个假设是命题与实在具有对应关系,第二个假设是肯定 命题(p)与否定命题(-p)同构,即互为真假。前一个假设产生了一个非常棘手的负(否定)事实问题,而后一 个假设本身也还有待证明,为了解决这些问题,维特根斯坦确立了两个基本原则,即可能性原则和同一意谓 原则(p和非p具有同一意谓)。本文主要论述了维特根斯坦逻辑哲学两个基本原则产生的背景及其内涵, 据此诠释了维特根斯坦所宣称的"我理论的主要特点是:认为p和非p具有同一意谓。"这一思想的基本内 核,同时指出了这两个基本原则对于哲学划界等问题的重要意义,从新的角度揭示了维特根斯坦逻辑哲学的 基本面貌。
In dealing with the problem of the corresponding relation between positive and negative propositions, the negative facts emerge from two assumptions (the interdependence of the positive and negative propositions and the correspondence between the propositions and the Reality), the two basic principles (principle of possibility and principle of p and - p have the same meaning, )are laid out in Wittgenstein's logical philosophy. The limit of what can be said and what cannot be said is drawn according to these basic principles. This helps to bring about the chief characteristic of Wittgenstein's Logical Philosophy that ' p has the same meaning as not - p' .
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第2期37-42,共6页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
