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国有企业外部人控制的寻租解释 被引量:2

Outsiders Control of SOE Based on Rent-seeking Theory
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摘要 国有企业的公共物品性导致国有企业蜕变为一个多重寻租网络。政府作为国有企业的外部控制人,与国有企业代理人合谋寻租,国有企业的"内部人控制"应运而生。可以说,国有企业若不存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"几乎不可能产生;国有企业若存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"便几乎一定会产生。"外部人控制"产生的必要前提是国有企业泛化为公共物品,而国有企业泛化为公共物品,必须具备以下条件,包括存在可供寻租的租金、存在制度性的寻租通道、存在租金和信息的传递系统。国有企业外部人控制具有极大的危害,解决问题的关键在于进行产权改革,并使产权得到有效的保护,同时不会出现事后寻租的现象。 The nature of public goods causes SOEs to become a multiple network ofrent-seeking. As the outsiders of SOEs, the governments conspire with the agentsof state-owned enterprises to seek rent which results from insiders control. We can say if there is no outsiders control, no insiders control. If there is outsiders control, does also insiders control. The prerequisite of outsiders controlis that the state-owned enterprise turns into public goods. SOE's turning into public goods must satisfy following conditions including existing suitable renting, institutional rent-seeking passway and transmission system of rent and message. Outsiders control in state-owned enterprise has great dangers, and the key to solve the problem lies in carrying on property right reform, and make the property right be protected effectively while rent-seeking afterwards not appearring atthe same time.
出处 《预测》 CSSCI 2005年第2期29-33,共5页 Forecasting
关键词 公共物品 多重寻租网络 外部人控制 产权 public goods multiple network of rent-seeking outsiders control property right
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