摘要
分析了假冒伪劣商品治理中的政府官员行为,对于政府官员的渎职,提出了设计激励制度和改造组织 信息结构2种解决方法,证明了在对政府官员进行有效激励的前提下,对政府官员进行寻租的行为将不会发生。
In this paper we analyze the government officials' behavior of deterring counterfeits & inferior commodities. To solve malfeasance behavior of the government officials, we put forward two methods, the one is designing incentive contract and the other is reconstructing organization's information structure. For the more, in this paper it is proved that if the government official get suitable incentive there will not be rent-seeking taking place.
出处
《北京工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2005年第1期5-8,共4页
Journal of Beijing University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition)
基金
北京市自然科学基金资助项目(9032001)北京市教委基金资助项目(KP1104200370)
关键词
假冒伪劣商品
渎职
寻租
counterfeit & inferior commodities
malfeasance
rent-seeking
