摘要
独立董事的独立性依赖于其声誉,而其声誉的高低,则依赖于其个人财产的多寡以及独立董事津贴在其总收入中所占的比例。本文建立了一个独立董事声誉机制模型,依据独立董事对薪酬的依赖程度的观察,构建了选聘独立董事的声誉机制;并且认为由委员会提名,股东大会选举产生的独立董事的独立性较直接由董事会提名时要强。
Independent Directors(IDs), as agents of minority shareholders in listed companies, play a growing role in improving and bettering corporation governance and channeling companies' performance into legal maximization of both profitability and returns for all shareholders. Creditability mechanism of IDs in China, however, remains still incomplete and imperfect on account of adverse selection and moral hazard. The author, based on a summary of relevant researches on this subject and his study on salaries dependence extents to which IDs work honestly, justly and effectively, constructs a model of creditability mechanism for selection of IDs in China's listed companies, and puts forward suggestions for further research.
出处
《中南财经政法大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第2期72-76,111,共6页
Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
关键词
独立董事
声誉
薪酬依赖度
Independent Director
Creditability
Salary Dependence
