摘要
本文着重对两个银行之间竞争导向定价策略博弈行为进行了分析,认为在利率管制条件下,银行难以运用利率杠杆在信贷市场进行有效竞争;利率市场化之后,监管者不再对利率进行约束,银行信贷竞争的广度和深度都会随之加大。因此价格竞争将是银行信贷市场竞争的常态。
This article analyzes the game behavior of going-competition pricing tactics between two banks. On the condition of interest regulation, it is difficult for the bank to compete effectively in the credit market by way of interest lever. After marketing the interest, the regulator will not restrain the interest any more, and the scope and depth of bank's credit competition will also increase along with it. So loan pricing competition is the normality in market competition.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2005年第1期101-104,56,共5页
Operations Research and Management Science
关键词
金融学
贷款定价
博弈论
利率市场化
完全信息
不完全信息
finance
loan pricing
game theory
interest marketing
complete information
incomplete information
