摘要
我国上市公司处于大股东的超强控制状态,大股东与潜在投资者之间 严重的信息不对称导致了大股东在股权再融资过程中表现出强烈的盈余操纵动机。 本文建立了一个模型来分析大股东进行盈余操纵的机理,大股东通过调整利润的时 间分布可以改变投资者对上市公司盈利能力和投资价值的判断,从而造成股票再发 行价格的提升,使大股东获取更多的私人利益。存在盈余操纵成本的情况下,只要 盈余操纵的边际收益大于边际成本,实施盈余操纵就是大股东的最优选择,从而使 盈余操纵成为上市公司股权再融资过程中的普遍现象。
This paper introduces a model to analyse the mechanism of earnings manipulation, which large shareholders can change the assessment of the listed companies' profit ability and investment values through manipulating the time distribution of earnings , raise the price of equity , and snatch more private benefits. If the marginal gains of earnings manipulation exceed its marginal costs, the best strategy for large shareholders is to manipulate earnings, and leads to earnings manipulation becoming the common phenomena in seasoned equity offerings.
出处
《数量经济技术经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第3期119-126,共8页
Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70372057)。
关键词
大股东控制
股权再融资
盈余操纵
Control of Large Shareholders
Seasoned Equity Offerings
Earnings Manipulation