期刊文献+

非对称信息条件下供应链管理探微 被引量:1

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摘要 分析了供应链中非对称信息产生的原因和非对称信息条件下的委托代理关系,以及委托代理中的逆向选择和道德风险问题,提出了建立激励约束机制的对策。
机构地区 军事经济学院
出处 《科技创业月刊》 2005年第3期85-86,共2页 Journal of Entrepreneurship in Science & Technology
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