摘要
对国有企业实施破产和重组,本质上是政府对国有企业实施的一种相机治理机制。利用青木昌彦的相机治理结构模型分析得出,政府对国有企业这一相机治理机制是不成功的。由于信息不对称,占据信息优势的内部人可能谎报产出,改变政府对救助企业的租金的预期,控制着相机治理时机和方式的选择,相机治理主体由此产生错位,造成相机治理机制失效。
The imposed bankruptcy and reorganization of state-owned enterprises is a selective mechanism of governance. By analyzing Aoki's model, this paper concludes that such a mechanism is ineffective because of the asymmetric information between government and insiders. The insiders of state-owned enterprises will take the advantage of asymmetric information to manipulate the output and change the expectation of political rents of reorganization. Thus will result in the governance rights transferring to insiders. The insiders actually control the governance occasion option and become the subject of governance, which will lead to the ineffectiveness of the mechanism of governance.
出处
《集美大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2004年第4期51-54,共4页
Journal of Jimei University：Philosophy and Social Sciences
关键词
国有企业破产
治理机制失效
信息不对称
政治租金
bankruptcy of state-owned enterprise
ineffectiveness of governance
asymmetric information
political rents
