摘要
在信息不对称前提下,中小企业融资的主要阻碍之一就是道德风险问题。在信用担保机构的介入下,部分地解决了中小企业的融资难问题,但信用担保机构也面临着道德风险问题。本文通过构建博弈模型,分析了发生道德风险的条件,并提出了防范道德风险的对策。
Due to information asymmetry, the severe moral hazard has blocked the financing of small and medium enterprises. With the help of guarantee institutions, the difficulty of financing has been settled in some degree. Through gambling model analysis, the paper points out under what conditions the moral hazard will happen and gives the correspondent suggestions.
出处
《西安金融》
2005年第1期34-36,共3页
Xi'an Finance
