摘要
自 1994年分税制改革以来 ,我国税收立法权中央集权依然过多。地方不仅在税收征管权方面展开了对中央的“非正式分权” ,而且在税收收益权上存在过度分权问题。我国目前在税权划分上呈现“中央集权过多与地方分权过度并存”的悖论 ,制度分析则有助于化解这一悖论。
After the reform of tax-sharing system, there is little change about the centralization of tax legislation power; the local authorities have always being exceeding their collection and management power during the operation of the new system, and there is no doubt the decentralization of tax revenue benefit power. So there is a paradox that it seems centralization but actually is decentralized. Institutional analysis will be helpful for us to solve this paradox.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第5期87-91,共5页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
关键词
税收权利
中国
征收管理
制度
税收
立法权
Taxing Power System
Division of Taxing Power
Institutional Explanation
