摘要
依据马斯洛的需求层次理论 ,通过liapnuov定理和Chebyshev不等式阐明了公共需要的存在性与显化问题 ;运用博弈论基本知识与微观经济学的分析方法 ,通过一个两阶段非合作策略性博弈模型 ,说明了公共财政是建立在政府代理人与市场主体博弈均衡结果基础之上的 ,而现实中的不均衡是博弈双方理性的利益趋向的必然结果 ;没有恒善或恒恶的政府行为人或市场主体 ,博弈的结果产生了对政府代理人的激励与淘汰机制以及对市场主体的约束机制。这种治权民授、相互约束的制度框架奠定了公共财政形成的社会基础 ,而公共财政正是在这种由不均衡到均衡的博弈过程中产生 ,并得到不断发展与完善的。
Based on Maslow's neads hierarchy theory,this paper illustrates the existence and the appearance of public needs by applying the Liapnuov theorem and the Chebyshev inequity. The unthor uses a two-stage incorporation normal game model to clarify that the public finance is built based on the result of the game equilibrium between the government deputy and the market entity. In reality, the in-equilibrium is resulted from the two sides' interest-oriented instinct of the game. There isn't a eternally fierce or eternally charitable market entity and government deputy.Incentives mechanism & limitation mechanism for the government deputy,restraint system for the market entity are all results of the game.The institution of authority empowered by the people and that of inter-restraint are the social foundations of public finance. As the game is played,from in-equilibrium to equilibrium, public finance comes into being, is developed and improved.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第5期81-86,共6页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
