摘要
通过对信息不对称、外部性、有效预防与有效信赖的研究 ,从效率的角度提出独立审计责任规则的矛盾之处在于安排审计代理人对投资者损失承担责任会削弱对投资者的激励 ,而安排审计代理人逃避责任则会削弱对审计代理人的激励 ,并认为法律界以及公众与会计界分歧的焦点是如何区分与安排会计、审计和投资者的责任。
This paper researches independent auditor's responsibility regulation from the perspectives of information dissymmetry,externality,effective provention and effective trust.In the point of efficiency,the main problems related to independent auditor's responsibilidy regulation are that:(1)in the case an auditing agent is arranged to be responsible for a loss of its client investor,the regulation will weaken its incentives to investors,and (2) in contrast,if an auditing agent is arranged to be free of any resposibility for a loss of its client investor,the regulation will weaken its incentives to anditing agents.A critical legal arguement is focused on how to distinguish and allot the responsibilities of accountants,auditors and investorss.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第5期78-80,共3页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
