摘要
所有权与经营权的分离问题 ,在上世纪 30年代由伯勒 (Berle)与米恩斯 (Means)成功地引入到现代企业理论的核心。其主要思想为 :所有权与控制权的分离产生了一个条件 ,其中所有者的利益与最终经营者的利益可能往往背道而驰。并由此产生了旨在实现所有者利益最大化的针对经营者的激励机制。Demsetz等人对所有权与经营权分离的原因、条件有过深入地分析 ,在其基础上 ,讨论了拥有两家以上企业的所有者的委托行为 ,并且进一步考察了结合激励机制后 ,所有者的委托行为决策边界 ,进而从理论上解释了公司治理危机产生的原因 ,并提出了规范方案。
The separation of ownership and operation was introduced to the core of modern firm theory, whose dominant idea is that the benefits of owners and operators are deviated from each other because of the separation. And thus the incentive mechanism to the operators is required to maximize the benefit of the owners. Demsetz and his alike have studied intensively the cause and condition about the separation. The thesis mainly focuses on the proxy behavior of the owners who have the property of over two firms, and further on the border of decision made by the owners, combining with the incentive mechanism, which explains the reason of the crisis about the firm governance in theory and brings forward the reasons and feasible scheme.
出处
《石家庄经济学院学报》
2004年第4期410-413,共4页
Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics
