摘要
在具有需求方投标的电力市场中,需求方通过策略性投标以获取最大利润,从而影响了市场的均衡结果。该文对线性供应函数均衡的应用加以推广,将需求方投标纳入线性供应函数均衡中,基于最优潮流灵敏度,在时市场中考虑需求波动的情况下,推导出了整个市场均衡点的迭代求解算法。算例表明,无论输电约束存在与否,需求方投标均可显著降低发电商行使市场力的能力;在没有输电约束的情况下,纯策略的线性供应函数均衡是存在的;在输电约束起作用的情况下,随着需求的升高,会达到阻塞状态的纯策略的线性供应函数均衡。
In a competitive electricity market with demand side bidding, demand side can bid strategically to obtain the maximum gain and influence market equilibrium. For the hour-ahead electricity market with demand varying, this paper generalizes application of linear supply function equilibrium, incorporating demand side bidding in it in order to make the whole market equilibrium based on optimal power flow sensitivity. An iterative method is presented to compute this equilibrium. Numerical tests have been done and the results show that with and without transmission constraint, demand side bidding can prominently reduce the ability of generators to abuse market power; without transmission constraint, pure strategy linear supply function equilibrium can be attained, but pure strategy linear supply function equilibrium with transmission constraints can also be attained while load increasing to some degree.
出处
《中国电机工程学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第8期17-23,共7页
Proceedings of the CSEE
关键词
电力工业
电力市场
博弈论
电价
迭代求解算法
线性供应函数均衡点
投标
输电约束
Electric power engineering
Electricity Market
Linear supply function equilibrium
Demand side bidding
Optimal power flow sensitivity
