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有限合伙制代理风险及其控制制度安排

The Risk of Limited Partnership Agency and the Controlling System
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摘要 风险投资者投资于风险投资家创立和经营的风险资本组织,形成了他们之间的委托—代理关系,由于信息不对称,风险投资者要承担巨大的代理风险。而有限合伙制作为一种独特的企业组织形式,通过一套对风险投资家的激励和约束机制,有效地解决了这个难题。 Venture capital investors invest in venture capital organizations created and managed by venture capitalists, there exists the entrusting--agency relationship between them. Venture capital investors run great agency risk because of asymmetric information. The limited partnership as a particular kind of firmorganization can solve the problem effectively by a set of stimulation and controlling system.
出处 《安徽广播电视大学学报》 2004年第1期47-50,共4页 Journal of Anhui Radio & TV University
关键词 有限合伙制 信息不对称 逆向选择 道德风险 limited partnership asymmetric information adverse selection moral risk
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