摘要
本文以2001—2015年中国A股所有非金融类上市公司为样本,研究产业政策激励对上市企业股价崩盘风险的影响,并讨论了公司治理水平和产权性质对产业政策—股价崩盘风险关系的影响机理。研究结果表明:(1)产业政策激励会显著增加企业股价崩盘风险。(2)公司治理水平低显著增加产业政策对企业股价崩盘风险的加剧作用。(3)相对国有上市企业,产业政策对民营企业的股价崩盘风险的加剧作用更加显著。本文首次从产业政策层面拓展了股价崩盘风险的相关研究,同时对产业政策的制定与资本市场风险的防范具有一定的意义。
The article analyzes the "five-year plan"industrial policies promulgated by the state from the 2001-2015 China A-share non-financial listed companies,and tests the industrial policies through multiple regression analysis and double difference models. The impact of incentives on the risk of stock price crashes. The study found that industrial policy incentives are significantly and positively related to stock price collapse risks,that is,companies that are encouraged by industrial policies are at greater risk of stock price collapse than those that are not encouraged by industrial policies. Further research has found that industrial enterprises have a more significant effect on the stock price collapse risk of companies with lower corporate governance levels than those with high corporate governance. By studying the impact of property rights on the stock market crash risk of listed companies,it is found that compared with state-owned listed companies encouraged by industrial policies,the industrial policies of private listed companies encouraged by industrial policies have a more positive effect on the stock price collapse risk. These studies have expanded the research on the impact of industrial policies on micro-enterprises,and enriched the relevant literature on the stock price collapse risk. It has certain enlightenment significance for the formulation of China’s industrial policy and the prevention of stock price collapse risk and the stability of financial market.
作者
邓可斌
詹伟键
Kebin Deng;Weijian Zhan(School of Economics and Commerce,South China University of Technology;Department of Computer Science,Rice University)
出处
《金融科学》
2020年第2期49-64,共16页
Financial Science
关键词
股价崩盘风险
产业政策
代理成本
产权性质
Stock Price Collapse
Industrial Policies
Agency Cost
Ownership Nature
