摘要
越来越多的上市公司出现了无控股股东情形,这对于深受控股股东“掏空”问题困扰的中国资本市场似乎是福音。利用上市公司宣告无控股股东事件,本文以管理层股票交易超额收益度量管理层“寻租”行为,从内部人控制角度分析了无控股股东对管理层股票交易超额收益的影响。本文发现,无控股股东会导致更高的管理层股票交易超额收益;在影响路径上,本文发现无控股股东会加剧信息不对称,信息效应是其影响管理层股票交易超额收益的重要路径;无控股股东会导致实施更多的股权激励,股权激励也是其影响管理层股票交易超额收益的重要路径。横截面研究发现,高股权集中度、高分析师关注度和高金融发展程度能够缓解管理层“寻租”,减少股票交易超额收益。本文的研究表明,无控股股东时,虽然第二类代理冲突会消失,但这也会引发更为严重的第一类代理冲突,它们之间是“按下葫芦浮起瓢”的关系。
Using the listed company to announce the absence of controlling shareholders,this article analyzes the impact of absence of controlling shareholders on the excess return of managerial stock trading from the perspective of rent-seeking.This paper finds that when there is no controlling shareholder,it will lead to more serious managerial trading excess return;In the path analysis,this paper finds that absence of controlling shareholders will aggravate information asymmetry,and“information effect”is an important way to affect the abnormal return of managerial stock trading;absence of controlling shareholders will also increase equity incentives,and“equity incentives”is also an important way to affect the abnormal return of managerial trading.In cross-sectional analysis,this paper finds that high equity concentration,high analyst attention and high financial development can alleviate managerial rent-seeking and reduce stock trading excess returns.The research in this paper shows that when there is no controlling shareholder,although the second type of agent conflict will disappear,it will also lead to a more serious first type agent conflict.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第7期58-69,共12页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金(71962010,72002086)
江西省社科基金(23YJ11)资助
关键词
控股股东
内部人控制
管理层股票交易
超额收益
寻租
Controlling Shareholder
Insider Control
Managerial Stock Trading
Excess Return
Rent-seeking
