摘要
主要研究有灾难到达的可修流体排队中顾客的止步策略.灾难到达会导致系统故障停止服务,并迫使所有顾客离开.系统被清空后将进入维修状态,此时仍然允许顾客进入.假设新到达的顾客根据线性"收益-成本"效用函数决定是否进入缓冲器,在完全可见情形下得出了相应的纳什均衡策略和单位时间内的平均社会收益函数.最后利用Matlab进行数值仿真分析,研究了一些系统参数对单位时间内平均社会收益的影响.
In this paper,the equilibrium balking strategy in the fluid queue with catastrophes and breakdowns is discussed.The system is subject to catastrophes according to a Poisson process.Once a catastrophe occurs,the system becomes invalid and all customers are forced to leave.In the repair state,arrivals are still accepted.Customers use a linear reward-cost structure to evaluate the utilities they obtained after receiving the service.Then the Nash equilibrium balking strategies and the expected social benefit function per unit time are derived in the fully observable case.In addition,the effect of some parameters on the expected social benefit function per unit time is illustrated by some numerical examples.
作者
徐秀丽
刘锦平
XU Xiuli;LIU Jinping(School of Science,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004)
出处
《系统科学与数学》
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第7期1972-1984,共13页
Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金
河北省自然科学基金项目(A2019203313)
河北省高等学校科学研究重点项目(ZD2019079)资助课题
关键词
流体排队
故障维修
灾难到达
纳什均衡
单位时间内的平均社会收益
Fluid queue
breakdowns and repairs
catastrophe arrival
Nash equilibrium
expected social benefit per unit time
