In this article it is investigated the case of a three-part ultimatum game,where the proposer makes repeated sharing suggestions to the responder and a"third".This"third"is the regulatory factor of...In this article it is investigated the case of a three-part ultimatum game,where the proposer makes repeated sharing suggestions to the responder and a"third".This"third"is the regulatory factor of recurring bids,at a rate-at each time of the immediately preceding.This article answers to question like"what share would the proposer be willing to give to the responder in the case of three taking part in the ultimatum game?"Which would be moral and which fair?At which point of distribution would it be accepted by the responder?A Chi Square(x^(2))test is used.For this reason,after investigating the social integration factors through the literature,two small surveys trying to identify the distribution rate are conducted.We conclude that a share 0.40 could be accepted by the responder and the"third".展开更多
We propose an evolution model of cooperative agent and noncooperative agent aggregates to investigate the dynamic evolution behaviors of the system and the effects of the competing microscopic reactions on the dynamic...We propose an evolution model of cooperative agent and noncooperative agent aggregates to investigate the dynamic evolution behaviors of the system and the effects of the competing microscopic reactions on the dynamic evolution. In this model, each cooperative agent and noncooperative agent are endowed with integer values of cooperative spirits and nonco- operative spirits, respectively. The cooperative spirits of a cooperative agent aggregate and the noncooperative spirits of a noncooperative agent aggregate change via four competing microscopic reaction schemes： the win-win reaction between two cooperative agents, the lose-lose reaction between two noncooperative agents, the win-lose reaction between a coop- erative agent and a noncooperative agent （equivalent to the migration of spirits from cooperative agents to noncooperative agents）, and the cooperative agent catalyzed decline of noncooperative spirits. Based on the generalized Smoluchowski＇s rate equation approach, we investigate the dynamic evolution behaviors such as the total cooperative spirits of all coop- erative agents and the total noncooperative spirits of all noncooperative agents. The effects of the three main groups of competition on the dynamic evolution are revealed. These include： （i） the competition between the lose-lose reaction and the win-lose reaction, which gives rise to respectively the decrease and increase in the noncooperative agent spirits; （ii） the competition between the win-win reaction and the win-lose reaction, which gives rise to respectively the increase and decrease in the cooperative agent spirits; （iii） the competition between the win-lose reaction and the catalyzed-decline reaction, which gives rise to respectively the increase and decrease in the noncooperative agent spirits.展开更多
文摘In this article it is investigated the case of a three-part ultimatum game,where the proposer makes repeated sharing suggestions to the responder and a"third".This"third"is the regulatory factor of recurring bids,at a rate-at each time of the immediately preceding.This article answers to question like"what share would the proposer be willing to give to the responder in the case of three taking part in the ultimatum game?"Which would be moral and which fair?At which point of distribution would it be accepted by the responder?A Chi Square(x^(2))test is used.For this reason,after investigating the social integration factors through the literature,two small surveys trying to identify the distribution rate are conducted.We conclude that a share 0.40 could be accepted by the responder and the"third".
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 10875086 and 11175131)
文摘We propose an evolution model of cooperative agent and noncooperative agent aggregates to investigate the dynamic evolution behaviors of the system and the effects of the competing microscopic reactions on the dynamic evolution. In this model, each cooperative agent and noncooperative agent are endowed with integer values of cooperative spirits and nonco- operative spirits, respectively. The cooperative spirits of a cooperative agent aggregate and the noncooperative spirits of a noncooperative agent aggregate change via four competing microscopic reaction schemes： the win-win reaction between two cooperative agents, the lose-lose reaction between two noncooperative agents, the win-lose reaction between a coop- erative agent and a noncooperative agent （equivalent to the migration of spirits from cooperative agents to noncooperative agents）, and the cooperative agent catalyzed decline of noncooperative spirits. Based on the generalized Smoluchowski＇s rate equation approach, we investigate the dynamic evolution behaviors such as the total cooperative spirits of all coop- erative agents and the total noncooperative spirits of all noncooperative agents. The effects of the three main groups of competition on the dynamic evolution are revealed. These include： （i） the competition between the lose-lose reaction and the win-lose reaction, which gives rise to respectively the decrease and increase in the noncooperative agent spirits; （ii） the competition between the win-win reaction and the win-lose reaction, which gives rise to respectively the increase and decrease in the cooperative agent spirits; （iii） the competition between the win-lose reaction and the catalyzed-decline reaction, which gives rise to respectively the increase and decrease in the noncooperative agent spirits.
