In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of ...In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.展开更多
As a basic study to prevent accidents or concealment caused by violation of rules or regulations （which are regarded as uncooperative behavior）, an attempt was made to clarify the condition necessary for promoting c...As a basic study to prevent accidents or concealment caused by violation of rules or regulations （which are regarded as uncooperative behavior）, an attempt was made to clarify the condition necessary for promoting cooperation when the tit-for-tat strategy is adopted in the finite and repeated prisoner＇s dilemma situations. A mathematical model, in which three different strategies （tit-for-tat, all defection （individualism）, and all cooperation （altruism）） exist, was constructed in order to demonstrate the condition that can promote cooperative behaviors. As a result of an agent-agent computer simulation, it was shown that the tit-for-tat strategy promoted more cooperation than other strategies when the number of agents adopting the tit-for-tat strategy was dominant in the population and the discount parameter was larger. Next, it was explored how the tit-for-tat strategy in the finite and repeated prisoner＇s dilemma promotes cooperation using a human-agent computer simulation. In other words, the condition under which cooperative behavior is encouraged was clarified. In the simulation experiment, the discount rate was controlled as an experimental variable. As well as the first experiment above, the dominant occupation of the tit-for-tat strategy was found to lead to the promoted cooperation. Concerning the effect of discount parameter on the cooperative behavior, the cooperation rate tended to increase with the increase of discount parameter only when the t-t-for-tat strategy is dominant. As a whole, the type of change of discount parameter did not affect the cooperation rate.展开更多
文摘In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.
文摘As a basic study to prevent accidents or concealment caused by violation of rules or regulations （which are regarded as uncooperative behavior）, an attempt was made to clarify the condition necessary for promoting cooperation when the tit-for-tat strategy is adopted in the finite and repeated prisoner＇s dilemma situations. A mathematical model, in which three different strategies （tit-for-tat, all defection （individualism）, and all cooperation （altruism）） exist, was constructed in order to demonstrate the condition that can promote cooperative behaviors. As a result of an agent-agent computer simulation, it was shown that the tit-for-tat strategy promoted more cooperation than other strategies when the number of agents adopting the tit-for-tat strategy was dominant in the population and the discount parameter was larger. Next, it was explored how the tit-for-tat strategy in the finite and repeated prisoner＇s dilemma promotes cooperation using a human-agent computer simulation. In other words, the condition under which cooperative behavior is encouraged was clarified. In the simulation experiment, the discount rate was controlled as an experimental variable. As well as the first experiment above, the dominant occupation of the tit-for-tat strategy was found to lead to the promoted cooperation. Concerning the effect of discount parameter on the cooperative behavior, the cooperation rate tended to increase with the increase of discount parameter only when the t-t-for-tat strategy is dominant. As a whole, the type of change of discount parameter did not affect the cooperation rate.
