In the context of permissionless blockchains,users participate in bidding for transaction services,resembling an online auction.While past research highlights congestion’s positive impact on bidding prices in traditi...In the context of permissionless blockchains,users participate in bidding for transaction services,resembling an online auction.While past research highlights congestion’s positive impact on bidding prices in traditional online auctions,blockchain’s unique characteristics(i.e.,congestion-induced low service quality and data transparency)may alter user responses to congestion.Analyzing extensive Ethereum transaction data,this study explores the impact of congestion on users’bidding prices and its boundary conditions in terms of user behavioral features-prior experience,wealth,and variety-seeking tendencies for service types.Results indicate that congestion continues to positively impact users’bidding prices in the blockchain context.This effect is more pronounced among wealthier users and those with lower variety-seeking tendencies.Surprisingly,contrary to prior research,user experience is found to increase their bidding price,which may be driven by the experienced users’private information that lower prices may result in extremely long waiting times.This research extends the understanding of users’bidding behavior to the realm of blockchain and provides valuable insights into the dynamics of congestion in the blockchain context.We provide practical implications for both blockchain platform operators and users.展开更多
Due to the fact that consumers'privacy data sharing has multifaceted and complex effects on the e-commerce platform and its two sided agents,consumers and sellers,a game-theoretic model in a monopoly e-market is s...Due to the fact that consumers'privacy data sharing has multifaceted and complex effects on the e-commerce platform and its two sided agents,consumers and sellers,a game-theoretic model in a monopoly e-market is set up to study the equilibrium strategies of the three agents(the platform,the seller on it and consumers)under privacy data sharing.Equilibrium decisions show that after sharing consumers'privacy data once,the platform can collect more privacy data from consumers.Meanwhile,privacy data sharing pushes the seller to reduce the product price.Moreover,the platform will increase the transaction fee if the privacy data sharing value is high.It is also indicated that privacy data sharing always benefits consumers and the seller.However,the platform's profit decreases if the privacy data sharing value is low and the privacy data sharing level is high.Finally,an extended model considering an incomplete information game among the agents is discussed.The results show that both the platform and the seller cannot obtain a high profit from privacy data sharing.Factors including the seller's possibility to buy privacy data,the privacy data sharing value and privacy data sharing level affect the two agents'payoffs.If the platform wishes to benefit from privacy data sharing,it should increase the possibility of the seller to buy privacy data or increase the privacy data sharing value.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC)under Grant Nos.72231007 and 72401226Postdoctoral Fellowship Program of China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant No.GZC20232087.
文摘In the context of permissionless blockchains,users participate in bidding for transaction services,resembling an online auction.While past research highlights congestion’s positive impact on bidding prices in traditional online auctions,blockchain’s unique characteristics(i.e.,congestion-induced low service quality and data transparency)may alter user responses to congestion.Analyzing extensive Ethereum transaction data,this study explores the impact of congestion on users’bidding prices and its boundary conditions in terms of user behavioral features-prior experience,wealth,and variety-seeking tendencies for service types.Results indicate that congestion continues to positively impact users’bidding prices in the blockchain context.This effect is more pronounced among wealthier users and those with lower variety-seeking tendencies.Surprisingly,contrary to prior research,user experience is found to increase their bidding price,which may be driven by the experienced users’private information that lower prices may result in extremely long waiting times.This research extends the understanding of users’bidding behavior to the realm of blockchain and provides valuable insights into the dynamics of congestion in the blockchain context.We provide practical implications for both blockchain platform operators and users.
基金The National Social Science Foundation of China(No.17BGL196)。
文摘Due to the fact that consumers'privacy data sharing has multifaceted and complex effects on the e-commerce platform and its two sided agents,consumers and sellers,a game-theoretic model in a monopoly e-market is set up to study the equilibrium strategies of the three agents(the platform,the seller on it and consumers)under privacy data sharing.Equilibrium decisions show that after sharing consumers'privacy data once,the platform can collect more privacy data from consumers.Meanwhile,privacy data sharing pushes the seller to reduce the product price.Moreover,the platform will increase the transaction fee if the privacy data sharing value is high.It is also indicated that privacy data sharing always benefits consumers and the seller.However,the platform's profit decreases if the privacy data sharing value is low and the privacy data sharing level is high.Finally,an extended model considering an incomplete information game among the agents is discussed.The results show that both the platform and the seller cannot obtain a high profit from privacy data sharing.Factors including the seller's possibility to buy privacy data,the privacy data sharing value and privacy data sharing level affect the two agents'payoffs.If the platform wishes to benefit from privacy data sharing,it should increase the possibility of the seller to buy privacy data or increase the privacy data sharing value.
