Operational mechanism of supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies is not ideal, the supervisory effect of the listed company rely on features of supervisors＇ board and member of the supervisors＇ board. Based on...Operational mechanism of supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies is not ideal, the supervisory effect of the listed company rely on features of supervisors＇ board and member of the supervisors＇ board. Based on the comparison of supervisory audit in Britain, Germany, France and Japan, and the empirical research on 100 listed companies in a share market, the paper analyses supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies, and proposes some perfection solutions to strengthen supervisory audit.展开更多
I the context of the Corporate Governance Code enactment in Japan, we examine how newly introduced outside directors in Japanese boards obtain information to take part in the decision-making process. We conducted a sy...I the context of the Corporate Governance Code enactment in Japan, we examine how newly introduced outside directors in Japanese boards obtain information to take part in the decision-making process. We conducted a systematic review of the literature and found 18 peer-reviewed publications in a time span between 2000 and 2016 that described the asymmetry of information between the insider group of board directors （including the CEO） and the outside board members. Our fmdings show that for the course of more than a decade, despite all changes and reforms, the role of board directors, whether insiders or outsiders, is still supplementary. They are treated more as advisors than active part in the decision-making process. We reveal different insider sources of information as forming social ties with the CEO and/or inside board directors and collaboration with Audit ＆ Supervisory Board （Kansayaku）, which can help reduce this asymmetry and improve the decision-making process. We assume that it will be easier for the outsiders to establish contacts and form social ties with the Audit ＆ Supervisory Board members because of their unspoken lower status and thus to obtain more information about the company internal affairs and discussions that take place during the informal meetings, where only insiders （including the CEO） are present.展开更多
文摘Operational mechanism of supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies is not ideal, the supervisory effect of the listed company rely on features of supervisors＇ board and member of the supervisors＇ board. Based on the comparison of supervisory audit in Britain, Germany, France and Japan, and the empirical research on 100 listed companies in a share market, the paper analyses supervisory audit in Chinese listed companies, and proposes some perfection solutions to strengthen supervisory audit.
文摘I the context of the Corporate Governance Code enactment in Japan, we examine how newly introduced outside directors in Japanese boards obtain information to take part in the decision-making process. We conducted a systematic review of the literature and found 18 peer-reviewed publications in a time span between 2000 and 2016 that described the asymmetry of information between the insider group of board directors （including the CEO） and the outside board members. Our fmdings show that for the course of more than a decade, despite all changes and reforms, the role of board directors, whether insiders or outsiders, is still supplementary. They are treated more as advisors than active part in the decision-making process. We reveal different insider sources of information as forming social ties with the CEO and/or inside board directors and collaboration with Audit ＆ Supervisory Board （Kansayaku）, which can help reduce this asymmetry and improve the decision-making process. We assume that it will be easier for the outsiders to establish contacts and form social ties with the Audit ＆ Supervisory Board members because of their unspoken lower status and thus to obtain more information about the company internal affairs and discussions that take place during the informal meetings, where only insiders （including the CEO） are present.
