Let {Xn,n ≥ 1} be a sequence of arbitrary continuous random variables,we introduce the notion of limit asymptotic logarithm likelihood ratio r（ω）,as a measure of dissimilarity between probability measure P and ref...Let {Xn,n ≥ 1} be a sequence of arbitrary continuous random variables,we introduce the notion of limit asymptotic logarithm likelihood ratio r（ω）,as a measure of dissimilarity between probability measure P and reference measure Q.We get some strong deviation theorems for the partial sums of arbitrary continuous random variables under Chung-Teicher＇s type conditions[6-7].展开更多
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d...The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.展开更多
基金Supported by Anhui High Education Research(2006Kj246B)
文摘Let {Xn,n ≥ 1} be a sequence of arbitrary continuous random variables,we introduce the notion of limit asymptotic logarithm likelihood ratio r（ω）,as a measure of dissimilarity between probability measure P and reference measure Q.We get some strong deviation theorems for the partial sums of arbitrary continuous random variables under Chung-Teicher＇s type conditions[6-7].
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.7117112071373262 and 71571108)+3 种基金Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
文摘The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
