The purpose of this study is to identify the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and strategic change of a firm in the Chinese context. In this study, strategic change is defined as stra...The purpose of this study is to identify the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and strategic change of a firm in the Chinese context. In this study, strategic change is defined as strategic deviation relative to industry norms and strategic variation relative to historical experiences. The size, independence and leadership structure of the board of directors are defined as the board characteristics. We then propose hypotheses on the effects of board characteristics on a firm＇s strategic change. This study takes strategic resource allocation profile as measure to calculate strategic deviation and strategic variation, and then empirically tests and verifies the hypotheses using data from Chinese publicly listed companies in the information technology industry from the year 2006 to 2010. We find that the size, independence and leadership structure of the board of directors significantly affect both strategic deviation and strategic variation. Therefore, we conclude that board characteristic affects a firm＇s strategic change. The conclusion of the study indicates that moderate reductions in the size of the board, increasing the proportion of independent directors and separating the roles of chairman and chief executive officer can facilitate promoting the process of strategic change for a firm in a dynamic environment. Through this study we re-examine the role and significance of the board of directors in strategic decision-making for a firm, and provide useful suggestions on how to form a board that can meet the needs for strategic change for a firm in a dynamic business environment.展开更多
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d...The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.展开更多
基金We gratefully acknowledge support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China （No. 70872048, 71272184）, and the Key Program of Key Research Institute for Humanities and Social Science, Ministry of Education （No. 11JJD630005）.
文摘The purpose of this study is to identify the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and strategic change of a firm in the Chinese context. In this study, strategic change is defined as strategic deviation relative to industry norms and strategic variation relative to historical experiences. The size, independence and leadership structure of the board of directors are defined as the board characteristics. We then propose hypotheses on the effects of board characteristics on a firm＇s strategic change. This study takes strategic resource allocation profile as measure to calculate strategic deviation and strategic variation, and then empirically tests and verifies the hypotheses using data from Chinese publicly listed companies in the information technology industry from the year 2006 to 2010. We find that the size, independence and leadership structure of the board of directors significantly affect both strategic deviation and strategic variation. Therefore, we conclude that board characteristic affects a firm＇s strategic change. The conclusion of the study indicates that moderate reductions in the size of the board, increasing the proportion of independent directors and separating the roles of chairman and chief executive officer can facilitate promoting the process of strategic change for a firm in a dynamic environment. Through this study we re-examine the role and significance of the board of directors in strategic decision-making for a firm, and provide useful suggestions on how to form a board that can meet the needs for strategic change for a firm in a dynamic business environment.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.7117112071373262 and 71571108)+3 种基金Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
文摘The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
