In this paper, the attack detection problem is investigated for a class of closed-loop systems subjected to unknownbutbounded noises in the presence of stealthy attacks. The measurement outputs from the sensors are qu...In this paper, the attack detection problem is investigated for a class of closed-loop systems subjected to unknownbutbounded noises in the presence of stealthy attacks. The measurement outputs from the sensors are quantized before transmission.A specific type of perfect stealthy attack, which meets certain rather stringent conditions, is taken into account. Such attacks could be injected by adversaries into both the sensor-toestimator and controller-to-actuator channels, with the aim of disrupting the normal data flow. For the purpose of defending against these perfect stealthy attacks, a novel scheme based on watermarks is developed. This scheme includes the injection of watermarks(applied to data prior to quantization) and the recovery of data(implemented before the data reaches the estimator).The watermark-based scheme is designed to be both timevarying and hidden from adversaries through incorporating a time-varying and bounded watermark signal. Subsequently, a watermark-based attack detection strategy is proposed which thoroughly considers the characteristics of perfect stealthy attacks,thereby ensuring that an alarm is activated upon the occurrence of such attacks. An example is provided to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed mechanism for detecting attacks.展开更多
This paper investigates the security issue of multisensor remote estimation systems.An optimal stealthy false data injection(FDI)attack scheme based on historical and current residuals,which only tampers with the meas...This paper investigates the security issue of multisensor remote estimation systems.An optimal stealthy false data injection(FDI)attack scheme based on historical and current residuals,which only tampers with the measurement residuals of partial sensors due to limited attack resources,is proposed to maximally degrade system estimation performance.The attack stealthiness condition is given,and then the estimation error covariance in compromised state is derived to quantify the system performance under attack.The optimal attack strategy is obtained by solving several convex optimization problems which maximize the trace of the compromised estimation error covariance subject to the stealthiness condition.Moreover,due to the constraint of attack resources,the selection principle of the attacked sensor is provided to determine which sensor is attacked so as to hold the most impact on system performance.Finally,simulation results are presented to verify the theoretical analysis.展开更多
Cyber-physical systems(CPSs)are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their integral connection between cyberspace and the physical world,which is augmented by Internet connectivity.This vulnerability necess...Cyber-physical systems(CPSs)are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their integral connection between cyberspace and the physical world,which is augmented by Internet connectivity.This vulnerability necessitates a heightened focus on developing resilient control mechanisms for CPSs.However,current observer-based active compensation resilient controllers exhibit poor performance against stealthy deception attacks(SDAs)due to the difficulty in accurately reconstructing system states because of the stealthy nature of these attacks.Moreover,some non-active compensation approaches are insufficient when there is a complete loss of actuator control authority.To address these issues,we introduce a novel learning-based passive resilient controller(LPRC).Our approach,unlike observer-based state reconstruction,shows enhanced effectiveness in countering SDAs.We developed a safety state set,represented by an ellipsoid,to ensure CPS stability under SDA conditions,maintaining system trajectories within this set.Additionally,by employing deep reinforcement learning(DRL),the LPRC acquires the capacity to adapt and diverse evolving attack strategies.To empirically substantiate our methodology,various attack methods were compared with current passive and active compensation resilient control methods to evaluate their performance.展开更多
This paper,from the view of a defender,addresses the security problem of cyber-physical systems(CPSs)subject to stealthy false data injection(FDI)attacks that cannot be detected by a residual-based anomaly detector wi...This paper,from the view of a defender,addresses the security problem of cyber-physical systems(CPSs)subject to stealthy false data injection(FDI)attacks that cannot be detected by a residual-based anomaly detector without other defensive measures.To detect such a class of FDI attacks,a stochastic coding scheme,which codes the sensor measurement with a Gaussian stochastic signal at the sensor side,is proposed to assist an anomaly detector to expose the FDI attack.In order to ensure the system performance in the normal operational context,a decoder is adopted to decode the coded sensor measurement when received at the controller side.With this detection scheme,the residual under the attack can be significantly different from that in the normal situation,and thus trigger an alarm.The design condition of the coding signal covariance is derived to meet the constraints of false alarm rate and attack detection rate.To minimize the trace of the coding signal covariance,the design problem of the coding signal is converted into a constraint non-convex optimization problem,and an estimation-optimization iteration algorithm is presented to obtain a numerical solution of the coding signal covariance.A numerical example is given to verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.展开更多
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(61933007,62273087,62273088,U21A2019)the Shanghai Pujiang Program of China(22PJ1400400)+2 种基金the Hainan Province Science and Technology Special Fund of China(ZDYF2022SHFZ105)the Royal Society of U.K.the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation of Germany
文摘In this paper, the attack detection problem is investigated for a class of closed-loop systems subjected to unknownbutbounded noises in the presence of stealthy attacks. The measurement outputs from the sensors are quantized before transmission.A specific type of perfect stealthy attack, which meets certain rather stringent conditions, is taken into account. Such attacks could be injected by adversaries into both the sensor-toestimator and controller-to-actuator channels, with the aim of disrupting the normal data flow. For the purpose of defending against these perfect stealthy attacks, a novel scheme based on watermarks is developed. This scheme includes the injection of watermarks(applied to data prior to quantization) and the recovery of data(implemented before the data reaches the estimator).The watermark-based scheme is designed to be both timevarying and hidden from adversaries through incorporating a time-varying and bounded watermark signal. Subsequently, a watermark-based attack detection strategy is proposed which thoroughly considers the characteristics of perfect stealthy attacks,thereby ensuring that an alarm is activated upon the occurrence of such attacks. An example is provided to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed mechanism for detecting attacks.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(61925303,62173034,62088101,U20B2073,62173002)the National Key Research and Development Program of China(2021YFB1714800)Beijing Natural Science Foundation(4222045)。
文摘This paper investigates the security issue of multisensor remote estimation systems.An optimal stealthy false data injection(FDI)attack scheme based on historical and current residuals,which only tampers with the measurement residuals of partial sensors due to limited attack resources,is proposed to maximally degrade system estimation performance.The attack stealthiness condition is given,and then the estimation error covariance in compromised state is derived to quantify the system performance under attack.The optimal attack strategy is obtained by solving several convex optimization problems which maximize the trace of the compromised estimation error covariance subject to the stealthiness condition.Moreover,due to the constraint of attack resources,the selection principle of the attacked sensor is provided to determine which sensor is attacked so as to hold the most impact on system performance.Finally,simulation results are presented to verify the theoretical analysis.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(52332011).
文摘Cyber-physical systems(CPSs)are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their integral connection between cyberspace and the physical world,which is augmented by Internet connectivity.This vulnerability necessitates a heightened focus on developing resilient control mechanisms for CPSs.However,current observer-based active compensation resilient controllers exhibit poor performance against stealthy deception attacks(SDAs)due to the difficulty in accurately reconstructing system states because of the stealthy nature of these attacks.Moreover,some non-active compensation approaches are insufficient when there is a complete loss of actuator control authority.To address these issues,we introduce a novel learning-based passive resilient controller(LPRC).Our approach,unlike observer-based state reconstruction,shows enhanced effectiveness in countering SDAs.We developed a safety state set,represented by an ellipsoid,to ensure CPS stability under SDA conditions,maintaining system trajectories within this set.Additionally,by employing deep reinforcement learning(DRL),the LPRC acquires the capacity to adapt and diverse evolving attack strategies.To empirically substantiate our methodology,various attack methods were compared with current passive and active compensation resilient control methods to evaluate their performance.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.61925303,62088101,U20B2073,61720106011,and 62173002the National Key R&D Program of China under Grant No.2018YFB1700100the Beijing Natural Science Foundation under Grant No.4222045。
文摘This paper,from the view of a defender,addresses the security problem of cyber-physical systems(CPSs)subject to stealthy false data injection(FDI)attacks that cannot be detected by a residual-based anomaly detector without other defensive measures.To detect such a class of FDI attacks,a stochastic coding scheme,which codes the sensor measurement with a Gaussian stochastic signal at the sensor side,is proposed to assist an anomaly detector to expose the FDI attack.In order to ensure the system performance in the normal operational context,a decoder is adopted to decode the coded sensor measurement when received at the controller side.With this detection scheme,the residual under the attack can be significantly different from that in the normal situation,and thus trigger an alarm.The design condition of the coding signal covariance is derived to meet the constraints of false alarm rate and attack detection rate.To minimize the trace of the coding signal covariance,the design problem of the coding signal is converted into a constraint non-convex optimization problem,and an estimation-optimization iteration algorithm is presented to obtain a numerical solution of the coding signal covariance.A numerical example is given to verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
