Writable XOR executable （W⊕X） and address space layout randomisation （ASLR） have elevated the understanding necessary to perpetrate buffer overflow exploits [1] . However, they have not proved to be a panacea [1 ...Writable XOR executable （W⊕X） and address space layout randomisation （ASLR） have elevated the understanding necessary to perpetrate buffer overflow exploits [1] . However, they have not proved to be a panacea [1 3] , and so other mechanisms, such as stack guards and prelinking, have been introduced. In this paper, we show that host-based protection still does not offer a complete solution. To demonstrate the protection inadequacies, we perform an over the network brute force return-to-libc attack against a preforking concurrent server to gain remote access to a shell. The attack defeats host protection including W⊕X and ASLR. We then demonstrate that deploying a network intrusion detection systems （NIDS） with appropriate signatures can detect this attack efficiently.展开更多
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 60873208)
文摘Writable XOR executable （W⊕X） and address space layout randomisation （ASLR） have elevated the understanding necessary to perpetrate buffer overflow exploits [1] . However, they have not proved to be a panacea [1 3] , and so other mechanisms, such as stack guards and prelinking, have been introduced. In this paper, we show that host-based protection still does not offer a complete solution. To demonstrate the protection inadequacies, we perform an over the network brute force return-to-libc attack against a preforking concurrent server to gain remote access to a shell. The attack defeats host protection including W⊕X and ASLR. We then demonstrate that deploying a network intrusion detection systems （NIDS） with appropriate signatures can detect this attack efficiently.
