The two-tier shareholding structure,which originated in the United States,has become popular around the world.Unlike the traditional model of“equal shares with equal rights”,the core feature of the two-tier sharehol...The two-tier shareholding structure,which originated in the United States,has become popular around the world.Unlike the traditional model of“equal shares with equal rights”,the core feature of the two-tier shareholding structure is that the company issues two classes of shares with different voting rights.It enables the concentration and stabilization of corporate control,which has a positive effect on the long-term development of the company and resistance to hostile takeovers.Against the background of the rapid development of the capital market and the continuous innovation of corporate governance structure,the two-tier shareholding structure has begun to be adopted by many enterprises.While this structure can improve the efficiency of corporate governance and promote corporate growth,it also raises a number of challenges.In particular,for small and medium-sized shareholders,their shareholdings may face the problem of limited or no voting rights,as well as the lack of an effective internal and external monitoring mechanism for the company.These issues may lead to the impairment of the rights of small and medium-sized shareholders.Currently,challenges in practice include inadequate laws and regulations,insufficient disclosure of information,and inadequate monitoring mechanisms.Therefore,exploring the path to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and analyzing their current situation has become an important area in the study of two-tier shareholding structures.This paper starts from the actual situation,analyzes the problems exposed in the operation process of two-tier shareholding structure,and then explores the practical and feasible methods to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders on this basis,with a view to putting forward valuable references for the development of China’s securities market.展开更多
“A limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own： Behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se”. The competitive at...“A limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own： Behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se”. The competitive attitude of the member states of the EU （European Union）, to become the most attractive for companies results in law reforms aiming at more flexible conflict between shareholders. Besides, the economic objective of avoiding a company＇s dissolution, the English, Dutch, and Belgian exit proceedings for the settlement of disputes between shareholders set up a social objective： protecting the interests of the minority shareholder of a private limited company. The paper consists of four chapters. The introduction lays out the necessity of buy-outs for shareholders of a private limited company. The first chapter describes the different facts justifying the buy-out of a shareholder on the basis of serious grounds. The second chapter presents the findings of a comparative research of the valuation of the shares transferred in an English, Dutch, and Belgian procedure. Finally, the conclusion summarises in which way the English, Dutch, and Belgian legal system protect the interests of the minority shareholder of a private limited company.展开更多
Based on the epistemology and methodology of organizational routine evolution, this paper presents a systematic analysis on how ultimate shareholders control listed companies by means of equity control chain in a pyra...Based on the epistemology and methodology of organizational routine evolution, this paper presents a systematic analysis on how ultimate shareholders control listed companies by means of equity control chain in a pyramid structure and social capital control chain hidden in social networks. First, this paper examines the internal logic of ultimate shareholders＇ double control chain and designs an iterative model for dynamic evolution intent proceeding from ultimate shareholders ＇degree of intent for social capital control. Finally, with the case study of Inner Mongolia Caoyuan Xingfa Co., Ltd., this paper reveals the process and mechanism of ultimate shareholders＇ creation of double control chain.展开更多
The study examines the moderating effects of financial performance on the relationship between financial leverage （FL） and shareholders return （SR）. Panel data of pharmaceutical companies listed in the National St...The study examines the moderating effects of financial performance on the relationship between financial leverage （FL） and shareholders return （SR）. Panel data of pharmaceutical companies listed in the National Stock Exchange （NSE） were used for 13 years for the period from 2002-03 to 2014-15. Findings indicated that FL is significantly related with SR. However, financial performance has an insignificant relationship with SR and did not moderate the relationship between FL and SR.展开更多
In China, major shareholders of private listed enterprise could control its production and operation by virtue of few resources which makes it possible for ultimate controlling shareholders to expropriate minority sha...In China, major shareholders of private listed enterprise could control its production and operation by virtue of few resources which makes it possible for ultimate controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders＇ rights and interests.In this paper, we studied the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders and business performance of private enterprises based on the theory of ultimate controlling shareholders and made relevant conclusions and recommendations.展开更多
In this study, the cooperative shareholders＇ performance and satisfaction were investigated as antecedent. Charismatic leadership of cooperative managers has been identified as antecedent. In addition, shareholders＇...In this study, the cooperative shareholders＇ performance and satisfaction were investigated as antecedent. Charismatic leadership of cooperative managers has been identified as antecedent. In addition, shareholders＇ age, education, land size, and duration of membership in the cooperative were investigated to have effect on the shareholder＇s performance and satisfaction. Charismatic leadership of cooperative managers is the subject of research on the effects of performance and satisfaction of the cooperative shareholders. A field survey was conducted. This study has been applied to Cukobirlik, an agricultural sale cooperative in East Mediterranean of Turkey. The researchers collected data by random questionnaire method. The research data were collected from 155 cooperative shareholders. For the data, exploratory factor, correlation, and regression were analyzed. The results of this analysis show that there is a meaningful relationship between charismatic leaders and the performance and satisfaction of shareholders for these cooperatives. Another result, there is significant relation between land size of cooperative shareholders and the performance and satisfaction of cooperative shareholders.展开更多
Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the comp...Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company.This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment(CEPI).We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI.Specifically,external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI.In addition,after participating in SOEs,non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.展开更多
Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are importan...Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners(and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private(i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.展开更多
According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with ...According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders.However,due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China,large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends.They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights.An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase.However,when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder,expropriation activities ease significantly.展开更多
Compliance,as a very important aspect of corporate governance,has developed earlier in the world,while China's compliance management has developed relatively late and is currently lacking in development.However,ma...Compliance,as a very important aspect of corporate governance,has developed earlier in the world,while China's compliance management has developed relatively late and is currently lacking in development.However,many enterprises suffer serious losses without compliance management,especially import and export enterprises,which are forced to exit the market due to poor compliance management.This article is based on the urgent need of Chinese enterprises for compliance management,but the lack of research by scholars.It summarizes the literature on the factors affecting compliance,hoping to be helpful for the study of compliance management.展开更多
This study employs leadership contingency theory and resource dependency theory,utilizing financial data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies between 2012 and 2021.Ultimately,data samples from 4,742 com...This study employs leadership contingency theory and resource dependency theory,utilizing financial data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies between 2012 and 2021.Ultimately,data samples from 4,742 companies were selected to empirically examine the impact and moderating role of female executives on corporate digital transformation.Findings reveal that the proportion of female executives positively promotes corporate digital transformation.Further analysis indicates that female executives drive digital transformation by enhancing corporate innovation investment and risk control capabilities.Supported by the heterogeneity analysis,it shows that this effect is more pronounced in high-tech industries,non-state-owned enterprises,and companies in economically developed regions.This study provides a gender-perspective theoretical explanation for the drivers of digital transformation and offers practical insights for optimizing corporate executive teams.展开更多
This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investo...This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and profit from private benefits of control. However, this agency conflict has been rarely studied, as the most commonly assumed agency conflict occurs between managers and shareholders. Using an audit fee model derived from , we study the impact of the nature of controlling shareholders on audit fees in French listed firms. Our results show: (1) a negative relationship between audit fees and government shareholdings; (2) a positive relationship between audit fees and institutional shareholdings; and (3) no relationship between audit fees and family shareholdings. These results illustrate the mixed effects of the nature of ownership on audit fees.展开更多
A major risk currently facing the Chinese economy is overcapacity,which affects the efficiency of social resource allocation(Xi et al.,2017;Huang et al.,2019).When a company is in crisis,the internal capital market of...A major risk currently facing the Chinese economy is overcapacity,which affects the efficiency of social resource allocation(Xi et al.,2017;Huang et al.,2019).When a company is in crisis,the internal capital market often plays a propping role.This study approached this issue from the perspective of the controlling shareholder and examined whether controlling shareholders provide financial support to enterprises in industries with excess capacity.According to the data for China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to2019,companies in industries with excess capacity received more financial support from controlling shareholders compared with those in non-overcapacity industries.Analysis of the mechanism revealed that state-owned enterprises and companies with relatively poor financial status received more financial support from controlling shareholders.This study also examined the economic consequences of such support and found that it is conducive to enhancing enterprise value.This study enriches the literature on overcapacity and internal capital markets by demonstrating that internal capital markets play a propping role for companies facing industry-level crises.This finding has both theoretical value and practical implications related to supply-side reform and capacity reduction.展开更多
The Taiwan Residents government offers firms that invest in qualified projects in emerging high-tech industries two mutually exclusive tax incentives—a corporate 5-year tax exemption or shareholder investment tax cre...The Taiwan Residents government offers firms that invest in qualified projects in emerging high-tech industries two mutually exclusive tax incentives—a corporate 5-year tax exemption or shareholder investment tax credits. This study examines whether corporate managers take shareholder tax benefits into account in their corporate tax planning. The results show that privately held firms are more likely than listed firms to choose shareholder investment tax credits and forego corporate tax benefits. Listed firms with relatively high earnings response coefficients tend to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption, as it can enhance reported after-tax earnings. Further, in the 5-year period following their choice of a particular tax incentive, firms choosing a corporate 5-year tax exemption exhibit significantly lower earnings persistence than those choosing shareholder investment tax credits. Taken together, these results suggest that stock market pressure has a significant effect on firms' choices between corporate and shareholder tax benefits, and that the choice of tax incentives has an effect on future earnings quality.展开更多
This study takes debt financing as the entry point and explores the impact of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises from the perspectives of“unarticulated rules”and“articulated rules”.The study ...This study takes debt financing as the entry point and explores the impact of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises from the perspectives of“unarticulated rules”and“articulated rules”.The study finds that state-owned capital participation significantly reduces the debt financing costs of private enterprises and expands the scale of their debt financing.This conclusion remains valid after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests.Further analysis of the mechanism reveals that state-owned capital participation improves the debt financing of private enterprises through multiple channels:Enhancing their social reputation,mitigating the“statistical bias”they face,optimizing their information quality,and reducing the“shareholder-creditor”agency problems.This paper conceptualizes these benefits as the“complementary advantages of heterogeneous shareholders”.This not only constructs a theoretical framework for“reverse mixed-ownership reform”but also better narrates the Chinese story of“mixed-ownership reform”by adopting a more universally applicable theory of equity structure.Additionally,the paper supplements existing research on the macro-and meso-level relationship between the government and the market by exploring the government’s positive role at the micro-level.展开更多
This paper explores whether the level of stock price informativeness about listed companies’future earnings is influenced by investor sentiment.In prior studies,investor sentiment,which can be regarded as the mood of...This paper explores whether the level of stock price informativeness about listed companies’future earnings is influenced by investor sentiment.In prior studies,investor sentiment,which can be regarded as the mood of the market,is defined as a belief about unjustified firms’future cash flow,investment returns and risks in capital markets.At the same time,stock price informativeness indicates how much information about a firm’s future earnings is reflected by stock prices.Higher price informativeness indicates a higher market efficiency level.Using linear regression analysis based on panel data from China’s stock market and listed companies,this research documents how stock price informativeness can be reduced by investor sentiment during market pessimism.However,although the explanatory power of future earnings over stock returns is strengthened by positive sentiment,it is not certain that positive sentiment increases price informativeness since the asset price bubble exists with extreme market optimism.Furthermore,the effect of sentiment on price informativeness would be weakened by higher state-owned shareholding.These empirical results imply that sentiment,to a certain degree,causes the investors’ignorance during pessimism and exaggeration during optimism over firms’earning prospects.Moreover,investors usually lack favour for state-owned enterprises during optimism,even though these companies actually have considerable earning prospects.While during pessimism,which usually happens after a crisis,the profitability and reliability of these state-owned enterprises are again emphasised by investors.展开更多
This study examines how controlling shareholders influence firm performance through the mediating role of firm efficiency in transforming inputs into outputs.To achieve this objective,it conducts a mediation analysis ...This study examines how controlling shareholders influence firm performance through the mediating role of firm efficiency in transforming inputs into outputs.To achieve this objective,it conducts a mediation analysis with 5,000 bootstraps on a dataset of 2,849 firm-year observations of publicly listed firms in Malaysia from 2009 to 2019.The findings reveal a positive relationship between controlling shareholdings and firm performance,with both total and indirect effects having this positive relationship.Moreover,while controlling shareholdings improve firm performance,firm efficiency partially mediates this relationship.Thus,improved firm efficiency plays a critical role in understanding the relationship between governance by controlling shareholders and enhanced firm performance.In summary,this study contributes to the existing literature by expanding our understanding of the complex relationship between controlling shareholdings,firm efficiency,and firm performance.In addition,the findings shed light on the importance of indirect channels in shaping organizational outcomes.As such,this study provides a valuable direction for future research in this area.展开更多
The topic of the paper is the estimate of the benefit of control, according to the Barclay and Holderness method. The reference system of this research is Italy, given that the empirical evidence of the past which had...The topic of the paper is the estimate of the benefit of control, according to the Barclay and Holderness method. The reference system of this research is Italy, given that the empirical evidence of the past which had underlined private benefits particularly high among Italian companies and the reference period is 1999-2007. The idea of this research is to demonstrate that, since the Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 24, 1998 （Consolidated Law on Finance, henceforth Consolidated Law）, which has significantly changed the protection of minority shareholders, in Italian, the intensity of private benefits has on average declined sharply. To this end, considering the results of the empirical researches on periods pre-1998 and at the turn of the Consolidated Law, the paper provides evidence that the improvement of minority shareholder protection already shown by these researches is further accentuated over the years, because of the effects that the new regulatory framework has produced. In fact, the basic assumption is that the important laws, as Consolidate Law, require several years to produce the desired results in full. This idea is supported by the findings of research that show an average percentage of private benefits dropped to five percent of the capital. Hence, the investigation is extended to the demonstration of comparability of this estimation with other estimations quoted in literature, verifying the statistical significance of the correlations between the measures estimated and the variables considered as determinants in much of the literature.展开更多
文摘The two-tier shareholding structure,which originated in the United States,has become popular around the world.Unlike the traditional model of“equal shares with equal rights”,the core feature of the two-tier shareholding structure is that the company issues two classes of shares with different voting rights.It enables the concentration and stabilization of corporate control,which has a positive effect on the long-term development of the company and resistance to hostile takeovers.Against the background of the rapid development of the capital market and the continuous innovation of corporate governance structure,the two-tier shareholding structure has begun to be adopted by many enterprises.While this structure can improve the efficiency of corporate governance and promote corporate growth,it also raises a number of challenges.In particular,for small and medium-sized shareholders,their shareholdings may face the problem of limited or no voting rights,as well as the lack of an effective internal and external monitoring mechanism for the company.These issues may lead to the impairment of the rights of small and medium-sized shareholders.Currently,challenges in practice include inadequate laws and regulations,insufficient disclosure of information,and inadequate monitoring mechanisms.Therefore,exploring the path to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and analyzing their current situation has become an important area in the study of two-tier shareholding structures.This paper starts from the actual situation,analyzes the problems exposed in the operation process of two-tier shareholding structure,and then explores the practical and feasible methods to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders on this basis,with a view to putting forward valuable references for the development of China’s securities market.
文摘“A limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own： Behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se”. The competitive attitude of the member states of the EU （European Union）, to become the most attractive for companies results in law reforms aiming at more flexible conflict between shareholders. Besides, the economic objective of avoiding a company＇s dissolution, the English, Dutch, and Belgian exit proceedings for the settlement of disputes between shareholders set up a social objective： protecting the interests of the minority shareholder of a private limited company. The paper consists of four chapters. The introduction lays out the necessity of buy-outs for shareholders of a private limited company. The first chapter describes the different facts justifying the buy-out of a shareholder on the basis of serious grounds. The second chapter presents the findings of a comparative research of the valuation of the shares transferred in an English, Dutch, and Belgian procedure. Finally, the conclusion summarises in which way the English, Dutch, and Belgian legal system protect the interests of the minority shareholder of a private limited company.
基金Phased results of fund project： ＂Study on the Ultimate Shareholder＇s Control and Deprivation in Listed Companies from the Perspective of Social Capital,＂ sponsored by National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No. 71072072） ＂Study on Ultimate Control Rights of China＇s Listed Companies from the Perspective of Social Capital,＂ sponsored by Graduate Innovation Fund of Capital University of Economics and Business （Grant No.CUEB2010507）.
文摘Based on the epistemology and methodology of organizational routine evolution, this paper presents a systematic analysis on how ultimate shareholders control listed companies by means of equity control chain in a pyramid structure and social capital control chain hidden in social networks. First, this paper examines the internal logic of ultimate shareholders＇ double control chain and designs an iterative model for dynamic evolution intent proceeding from ultimate shareholders ＇degree of intent for social capital control. Finally, with the case study of Inner Mongolia Caoyuan Xingfa Co., Ltd., this paper reveals the process and mechanism of ultimate shareholders＇ creation of double control chain.
文摘The study examines the moderating effects of financial performance on the relationship between financial leverage （FL） and shareholders return （SR）. Panel data of pharmaceutical companies listed in the National Stock Exchange （NSE） were used for 13 years for the period from 2002-03 to 2014-15. Findings indicated that FL is significantly related with SR. However, financial performance has an insignificant relationship with SR and did not moderate the relationship between FL and SR.
文摘In China, major shareholders of private listed enterprise could control its production and operation by virtue of few resources which makes it possible for ultimate controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders＇ rights and interests.In this paper, we studied the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders and business performance of private enterprises based on the theory of ultimate controlling shareholders and made relevant conclusions and recommendations.
文摘In this study, the cooperative shareholders＇ performance and satisfaction were investigated as antecedent. Charismatic leadership of cooperative managers has been identified as antecedent. In addition, shareholders＇ age, education, land size, and duration of membership in the cooperative were investigated to have effect on the shareholder＇s performance and satisfaction. Charismatic leadership of cooperative managers is the subject of research on the effects of performance and satisfaction of the cooperative shareholders. A field survey was conducted. This study has been applied to Cukobirlik, an agricultural sale cooperative in East Mediterranean of Turkey. The researchers collected data by random questionnaire method. The research data were collected from 155 cooperative shareholders. For the data, exploratory factor, correlation, and regression were analyzed. The results of this analysis show that there is a meaningful relationship between charismatic leaders and the performance and satisfaction of shareholders for these cooperatives. Another result, there is significant relation between land size of cooperative shareholders and the performance and satisfaction of cooperative shareholders.
文摘Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company.This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment(CEPI).We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI.Specifically,external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI.In addition,after participating in SOEs,non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.
基金the financial support of the Deloitte Professorship
文摘Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners(and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private(i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.
基金funded by grants from the Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71772029)LiaoNing Revitalization Talents Program(No.XLYC2007052)Tax Accounting Research Center of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics
文摘According to classic corporate governance theory,strengthening large shareholders’cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders.However,due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China,large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends.They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights.An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase.However,when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder,expropriation activities ease significantly.
文摘Compliance,as a very important aspect of corporate governance,has developed earlier in the world,while China's compliance management has developed relatively late and is currently lacking in development.However,many enterprises suffer serious losses without compliance management,especially import and export enterprises,which are forced to exit the market due to poor compliance management.This article is based on the urgent need of Chinese enterprises for compliance management,but the lack of research by scholars.It summarizes the literature on the factors affecting compliance,hoping to be helpful for the study of compliance management.
文摘This study employs leadership contingency theory and resource dependency theory,utilizing financial data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies between 2012 and 2021.Ultimately,data samples from 4,742 companies were selected to empirically examine the impact and moderating role of female executives on corporate digital transformation.Findings reveal that the proportion of female executives positively promotes corporate digital transformation.Further analysis indicates that female executives drive digital transformation by enhancing corporate innovation investment and risk control capabilities.Supported by the heterogeneity analysis,it shows that this effect is more pronounced in high-tech industries,non-state-owned enterprises,and companies in economically developed regions.This study provides a gender-perspective theoretical explanation for the drivers of digital transformation and offers practical insights for optimizing corporate executive teams.
基金the financial support of the Fondation HEC (Project F0802)the INTACCT program (European Union, Contract No. MRTN-CT-2006-035850)
文摘This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and profit from private benefits of control. However, this agency conflict has been rarely studied, as the most commonly assumed agency conflict occurs between managers and shareholders. Using an audit fee model derived from , we study the impact of the nature of controlling shareholders on audit fees in French listed firms. Our results show: (1) a negative relationship between audit fees and government shareholdings; (2) a positive relationship between audit fees and institutional shareholdings; and (3) no relationship between audit fees and family shareholdings. These results illustrate the mixed effects of the nature of ownership on audit fees.
基金financial support from the Youth Program of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Approval No.72002234)the Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Sciences Research Project(Approval No.19YJC790072)the Young Teacher Development Fund of Central University of Finance and Economics(QJJ1801)
文摘A major risk currently facing the Chinese economy is overcapacity,which affects the efficiency of social resource allocation(Xi et al.,2017;Huang et al.,2019).When a company is in crisis,the internal capital market often plays a propping role.This study approached this issue from the perspective of the controlling shareholder and examined whether controlling shareholders provide financial support to enterprises in industries with excess capacity.According to the data for China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to2019,companies in industries with excess capacity received more financial support from controlling shareholders compared with those in non-overcapacity industries.Analysis of the mechanism revealed that state-owned enterprises and companies with relatively poor financial status received more financial support from controlling shareholders.This study also examined the economic consequences of such support and found that it is conducive to enhancing enterprise value.This study enriches the literature on overcapacity and internal capital markets by demonstrating that internal capital markets play a propping role for companies facing industry-level crises.This finding has both theoretical value and practical implications related to supply-side reform and capacity reduction.
文摘The Taiwan Residents government offers firms that invest in qualified projects in emerging high-tech industries two mutually exclusive tax incentives—a corporate 5-year tax exemption or shareholder investment tax credits. This study examines whether corporate managers take shareholder tax benefits into account in their corporate tax planning. The results show that privately held firms are more likely than listed firms to choose shareholder investment tax credits and forego corporate tax benefits. Listed firms with relatively high earnings response coefficients tend to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption, as it can enhance reported after-tax earnings. Further, in the 5-year period following their choice of a particular tax incentive, firms choosing a corporate 5-year tax exemption exhibit significantly lower earnings persistence than those choosing shareholder investment tax credits. Taken together, these results suggest that stock market pressure has a significant effect on firms' choices between corporate and shareholder tax benefits, and that the choice of tax incentives has an effect on future earnings quality.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China,“State-owned Capital Participation and Financial Behavior of Private Enterprises:A Study from the Perspective of‘Balance’and‘Complementarity’of Multiple Major Shareholders”(Grant No.72202230).
文摘This study takes debt financing as the entry point and explores the impact of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises from the perspectives of“unarticulated rules”and“articulated rules”.The study finds that state-owned capital participation significantly reduces the debt financing costs of private enterprises and expands the scale of their debt financing.This conclusion remains valid after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests.Further analysis of the mechanism reveals that state-owned capital participation improves the debt financing of private enterprises through multiple channels:Enhancing their social reputation,mitigating the“statistical bias”they face,optimizing their information quality,and reducing the“shareholder-creditor”agency problems.This paper conceptualizes these benefits as the“complementary advantages of heterogeneous shareholders”.This not only constructs a theoretical framework for“reverse mixed-ownership reform”but also better narrates the Chinese story of“mixed-ownership reform”by adopting a more universally applicable theory of equity structure.Additionally,the paper supplements existing research on the macro-and meso-level relationship between the government and the market by exploring the government’s positive role at the micro-level.
文摘This paper explores whether the level of stock price informativeness about listed companies’future earnings is influenced by investor sentiment.In prior studies,investor sentiment,which can be regarded as the mood of the market,is defined as a belief about unjustified firms’future cash flow,investment returns and risks in capital markets.At the same time,stock price informativeness indicates how much information about a firm’s future earnings is reflected by stock prices.Higher price informativeness indicates a higher market efficiency level.Using linear regression analysis based on panel data from China’s stock market and listed companies,this research documents how stock price informativeness can be reduced by investor sentiment during market pessimism.However,although the explanatory power of future earnings over stock returns is strengthened by positive sentiment,it is not certain that positive sentiment increases price informativeness since the asset price bubble exists with extreme market optimism.Furthermore,the effect of sentiment on price informativeness would be weakened by higher state-owned shareholding.These empirical results imply that sentiment,to a certain degree,causes the investors’ignorance during pessimism and exaggeration during optimism over firms’earning prospects.Moreover,investors usually lack favour for state-owned enterprises during optimism,even though these companies actually have considerable earning prospects.While during pessimism,which usually happens after a crisis,the profitability and reliability of these state-owned enterprises are again emphasised by investors.
基金Universiti Malaysia Pahang for its financial support to this research(University Research Grant Scheme RDU223303).
文摘This study examines how controlling shareholders influence firm performance through the mediating role of firm efficiency in transforming inputs into outputs.To achieve this objective,it conducts a mediation analysis with 5,000 bootstraps on a dataset of 2,849 firm-year observations of publicly listed firms in Malaysia from 2009 to 2019.The findings reveal a positive relationship between controlling shareholdings and firm performance,with both total and indirect effects having this positive relationship.Moreover,while controlling shareholdings improve firm performance,firm efficiency partially mediates this relationship.Thus,improved firm efficiency plays a critical role in understanding the relationship between governance by controlling shareholders and enhanced firm performance.In summary,this study contributes to the existing literature by expanding our understanding of the complex relationship between controlling shareholdings,firm efficiency,and firm performance.In addition,the findings shed light on the importance of indirect channels in shaping organizational outcomes.As such,this study provides a valuable direction for future research in this area.
文摘The topic of the paper is the estimate of the benefit of control, according to the Barclay and Holderness method. The reference system of this research is Italy, given that the empirical evidence of the past which had underlined private benefits particularly high among Italian companies and the reference period is 1999-2007. The idea of this research is to demonstrate that, since the Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 24, 1998 （Consolidated Law on Finance, henceforth Consolidated Law）, which has significantly changed the protection of minority shareholders, in Italian, the intensity of private benefits has on average declined sharply. To this end, considering the results of the empirical researches on periods pre-1998 and at the turn of the Consolidated Law, the paper provides evidence that the improvement of minority shareholder protection already shown by these researches is further accentuated over the years, because of the effects that the new regulatory framework has produced. In fact, the basic assumption is that the important laws, as Consolidate Law, require several years to produce the desired results in full. This idea is supported by the findings of research that show an average percentage of private benefits dropped to five percent of the capital. Hence, the investigation is extended to the demonstration of comparability of this estimation with other estimations quoted in literature, verifying the statistical significance of the correlations between the measures estimated and the variables considered as determinants in much of the literature.
