The wireless sensor network(WSN),as the terminal data acquisition system of the 5G network,has attracted attention due to advantages such as low cost and easy deployment.Its development is mainly restricted by energy....The wireless sensor network(WSN),as the terminal data acquisition system of the 5G network,has attracted attention due to advantages such as low cost and easy deployment.Its development is mainly restricted by energy.The traditional transmission control scheme is not suitable for WSNs due to the significant information interaction.A switchable transmission control scheme for WSNs based on a queuing game(SQGTC)is proposed to improve network performance.Considering that sensor nodes compete for the resources of sink nodes to realize data transmission,the competitive relationship between nodes is described from the perspective of a game.Different types of sensor node requests require a sink node to provide different service disciplines.Mathematical models of social welfare are established for a sink node under the service disciplines of first-come,first-served(FCFS),egalitarian processor sharing(EPS),and shortest service first(SSF).The optimal service strategies are obtained by maximizing social welfare.The sensor nodes provide the expected benefits and satisfy the service requirements of the requests,and the sink node switches the transmission control strategy for the service.Simulation results show that the proposed scheme improves the data transmission efficiency of WSNs and achieves the optimal allocation of resources.展开更多
Healthcare downstream referral programs,where patients are transferred to a community hospital after surgical treatment in a tertiary hospital for rehabilitation treatment,have been widely advocated.However,no appropr...Healthcare downstream referral programs,where patients are transferred to a community hospital after surgical treatment in a tertiary hospital for rehabilitation treatment,have been widely advocated.However,no appropriate payment scheme aligns incentives to promote the program.This paper mainly compares two payment schemes:bundled and unbundled,which refer to packaged versus separate payments for surgery and rehabilitation treatment.By establishing a three-stage Stackelberg game within a M/Cox-2/1 queuing framework,our paper considers a payer maximizing social welfare in the base model and a payer maximizing the system's long-term surplus in the extension.The base model finds that:(i)the payer pays less under the bundled payment scheme when the potential arrival rate is low and the delay cost is high;otherwise,in most cases,the payer pays more under the bundled payment scheme.(ii)The bundled payment scheme yields greater referral volume and a higher level of effort.(iii)The bundled payment scheme is a weak Pareto improvement(PI hereafter)when both the potential arrival rate and the delay cost are high;the unbundled payment scheme is a PI when the delay cost is moderate and the potential arrival rate is relatively low;otherwise,there is no PI.However,when the payer aims to maximize the system's long-term surplus with a limited budget,several different results are obtained.These results can provide practical insights for policymakers to coordinate downstream referral programs.展开更多
基金supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(Grant.No.FRF-BD-20-11A),C.G.(Cheng Gong)the Scientific and Technological Innovation Foundation of Shunde Graduate School,C.G.(Cheng Gong),USTB(Grant No.BK19AF005)the Industry University Research Cooperation Project No.39110067,C.G.(Cheng Gong).
文摘The wireless sensor network(WSN),as the terminal data acquisition system of the 5G network,has attracted attention due to advantages such as low cost and easy deployment.Its development is mainly restricted by energy.The traditional transmission control scheme is not suitable for WSNs due to the significant information interaction.A switchable transmission control scheme for WSNs based on a queuing game(SQGTC)is proposed to improve network performance.Considering that sensor nodes compete for the resources of sink nodes to realize data transmission,the competitive relationship between nodes is described from the perspective of a game.Different types of sensor node requests require a sink node to provide different service disciplines.Mathematical models of social welfare are established for a sink node under the service disciplines of first-come,first-served(FCFS),egalitarian processor sharing(EPS),and shortest service first(SSF).The optimal service strategies are obtained by maximizing social welfare.The sensor nodes provide the expected benefits and satisfy the service requirements of the requests,and the sink node switches the transmission control strategy for the service.Simulation results show that the proposed scheme improves the data transmission efficiency of WSNs and achieves the optimal allocation of resources.
基金the following financial support for the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article:Wenhui Zhou and Yanhong Gan was supported by the National Science Foundation of China,Grant/Award Numbers:71925002the Foundation for Innovative Research Groups of the National Natural Science Foundation of China,Grant/Award Numbers:72321001+3 种基金Yuanyuan Dang was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China,Grant/Award Numbers:72471095 and 72101090the Special Fund Project for Scientific and Technological Innovation(Soft Science)of Guangdong Province,Grant/Award Numbers:2022A1515011620 and 2024A1515011518Guangdong Philosophy and Social Sciences,Grant/Award Numbers:GD21YGL09 and 2023GZYB22Innovative Research Team of Shanghai International Studies University,Grant/Award Numbers:2023KFKT003.
文摘Healthcare downstream referral programs,where patients are transferred to a community hospital after surgical treatment in a tertiary hospital for rehabilitation treatment,have been widely advocated.However,no appropriate payment scheme aligns incentives to promote the program.This paper mainly compares two payment schemes:bundled and unbundled,which refer to packaged versus separate payments for surgery and rehabilitation treatment.By establishing a three-stage Stackelberg game within a M/Cox-2/1 queuing framework,our paper considers a payer maximizing social welfare in the base model and a payer maximizing the system's long-term surplus in the extension.The base model finds that:(i)the payer pays less under the bundled payment scheme when the potential arrival rate is low and the delay cost is high;otherwise,in most cases,the payer pays more under the bundled payment scheme.(ii)The bundled payment scheme yields greater referral volume and a higher level of effort.(iii)The bundled payment scheme is a weak Pareto improvement(PI hereafter)when both the potential arrival rate and the delay cost are high;the unbundled payment scheme is a PI when the delay cost is moderate and the potential arrival rate is relatively low;otherwise,there is no PI.However,when the payer aims to maximize the system's long-term surplus with a limited budget,several different results are obtained.These results can provide practical insights for policymakers to coordinate downstream referral programs.
