This study systematically examines the evolutionary trajectory and structural characteristics of China's Road Traffic Regulatory System(CRTRS) from 1949 to 2023, aiming to unravel its transformation from fragmente...This study systematically examines the evolutionary trajectory and structural characteristics of China's Road Traffic Regulatory System(CRTRS) from 1949 to 2023, aiming to unravel its transformation from fragmented, punitive enforcement to a coordinated, technology-enhanced governance model;drawing on historical institutionalism and policy feedback theory, it divides CRTRS's development into three periods—Exploratory(1949–1986), Development(1987–2002) and Refinement(2003–2023)—and employs quantitative content analysis on 217 central policy documents to identify critical policy tools, as well as their dynamic roles in systemic adaptation. Key findings reveal a paradigm shift from institutional authority to professionalized, preventive governance, driven by policy tool diversification and integration of public engagement with technological innovation, with historical institutionalism illuminating how path dependencies and critical junctures shaped institutional layering, and policy feedback theory explaining how stakeholder responses drove iterative adjustments in policy tools. The study introduces a dual-system framework distinguishing between accident-inducing and accident-containment subsystems, operationalizing the System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes(STAMP) to balance risk mitigation and adaptive strategies. Theoretically, this research enriches the adaptive governance literature by demonstrating how tool diversification enhances regulatory resilience in centralized systems—supported by historical institutionalist and policy feedback perspectives—challenging assumptions about centralization rigidity, while practically, it provides a framework for evidence-based policy design, emphasizing data-driven and participatory tools to address complex socio-economic and infrastructural challenges in road safety governance.展开更多
Stackelberg differential game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in diverse fields. In this paper, we survey recent applications of Stackelberg differential game models t...Stackelberg differential game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in diverse fields. In this paper, we survey recent applications of Stackelberg differential game models to the supply chain management and marketing channels literatures. A common feature of these applications is the specification of the game structure： a decentralized channel composed of a manufacturer and independent retailers, and a sequential decision procedure with demand and supply dynamics and coordination issues. In supply chain management, Stackelberg differential games have been used to investigate inventory issues, wholesale and retail pricing strategies, and outsourcing in dynamic environments. The underlying demand typically has growth dynamics or seasonal variation. In marketing, Stackelberg differential games have been used to model cooperative advertising programs, store brand and national brand advertising strategies, shelf space allocation, and pricing and advertising decisions. The demand dynamics are usually extensions of the classical advertising capital models or sales-advertising response models. We begin by explaining the Stackelberg differential game solution methodology and then provide a description of the models and results reported in the literature.展开更多
基金supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 23AGL038)。
文摘This study systematically examines the evolutionary trajectory and structural characteristics of China's Road Traffic Regulatory System(CRTRS) from 1949 to 2023, aiming to unravel its transformation from fragmented, punitive enforcement to a coordinated, technology-enhanced governance model;drawing on historical institutionalism and policy feedback theory, it divides CRTRS's development into three periods—Exploratory(1949–1986), Development(1987–2002) and Refinement(2003–2023)—and employs quantitative content analysis on 217 central policy documents to identify critical policy tools, as well as their dynamic roles in systemic adaptation. Key findings reveal a paradigm shift from institutional authority to professionalized, preventive governance, driven by policy tool diversification and integration of public engagement with technological innovation, with historical institutionalism illuminating how path dependencies and critical junctures shaped institutional layering, and policy feedback theory explaining how stakeholder responses drove iterative adjustments in policy tools. The study introduces a dual-system framework distinguishing between accident-inducing and accident-containment subsystems, operationalizing the System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes(STAMP) to balance risk mitigation and adaptive strategies. Theoretically, this research enriches the adaptive governance literature by demonstrating how tool diversification enhances regulatory resilience in centralized systems—supported by historical institutionalist and policy feedback perspectives—challenging assumptions about centralization rigidity, while practically, it provides a framework for evidence-based policy design, emphasizing data-driven and participatory tools to address complex socio-economic and infrastructural challenges in road safety governance.
文摘Stackelberg differential game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in diverse fields. In this paper, we survey recent applications of Stackelberg differential game models to the supply chain management and marketing channels literatures. A common feature of these applications is the specification of the game structure： a decentralized channel composed of a manufacturer and independent retailers, and a sequential decision procedure with demand and supply dynamics and coordination issues. In supply chain management, Stackelberg differential games have been used to investigate inventory issues, wholesale and retail pricing strategies, and outsourcing in dynamic environments. The underlying demand typically has growth dynamics or seasonal variation. In marketing, Stackelberg differential games have been used to model cooperative advertising programs, store brand and national brand advertising strategies, shelf space allocation, and pricing and advertising decisions. The demand dynamics are usually extensions of the classical advertising capital models or sales-advertising response models. We begin by explaining the Stackelberg differential game solution methodology and then provide a description of the models and results reported in the literature.
