Cognitive bias,stemming from electronic measurement error and variability in human perception,exists in cognitive electronic warfare and affects the outcomes of conflicts.In this paper,the dynamic game approach is emp...Cognitive bias,stemming from electronic measurement error and variability in human perception,exists in cognitive electronic warfare and affects the outcomes of conflicts.In this paper,the dynamic game approach is employed to develop a model for cognitive bias induced by incomplete information and measurement errors in cognitive radar countermeasures.The payoffs for both parties are calculated using the radar's anti-jamming strategy matrix A and the jammer's jamming strategy matrix B.With perfect Bayesian equilibrium,a dynamic radar countermeasure model is established,and the impact of cognitive bias is analyzed.Drawing inspiration from the cognitive bias analysis method used in stock market trading,a cognitive bias model for cognitive radar countermeasures is introduced,and its correctness is mathematically proved.A gaming scenario involving the AN/SPY-1 radar and a smart jammer is set up to analyze the influence of cognitive bias on game outcomes.Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed method.展开更多
The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-...The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system （denoted by the probability distribution） and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.展开更多
文摘Cognitive bias,stemming from electronic measurement error and variability in human perception,exists in cognitive electronic warfare and affects the outcomes of conflicts.In this paper,the dynamic game approach is employed to develop a model for cognitive bias induced by incomplete information and measurement errors in cognitive radar countermeasures.The payoffs for both parties are calculated using the radar's anti-jamming strategy matrix A and the jammer's jamming strategy matrix B.With perfect Bayesian equilibrium,a dynamic radar countermeasure model is established,and the impact of cognitive bias is analyzed.Drawing inspiration from the cognitive bias analysis method used in stock market trading,a cognitive bias model for cognitive radar countermeasures is introduced,and its correctness is mathematically proved.A gaming scenario involving the AN/SPY-1 radar and a smart jammer is set up to analyze the influence of cognitive bias on game outcomes.Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
基金Supported by the Major National Science and Technology program (2011ZX03005-002)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60872041, 61072066, 60963023, 60970143)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (JY10000903001, JY10000901034)
文摘The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system （denoted by the probability distribution） and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.
