This paper examines the optimal decisions on operations and financing modes of a capital-constrained manufacturer selling two different quality levels of products through an online dual-channel.The manufacturer can mi...This paper examines the optimal decisions on operations and financing modes of a capital-constrained manufacturer selling two different quality levels of products through an online dual-channel.The manufacturer can mitigate financial constrains by leveraging either e-commerce platform financing or bank financing.The Stackelberg game models are established under both financing modes to analyze the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform.Additionally,the study explores the effects of financing interest rates and product quality differences on equilibrium outcomes in the online dual-channel.The findings reveal the following:(i)As financing interest rates increase,total product sales decline.While product prices may rise,this does not necessarily intensify price competition within the online dual-channel.(ii)When the e-commerce platform’s financing rate exceeds the bank rate,the manufacturer sets higher direct sales prices.Beyond a specific threshold,distribution prices rise,and total sales decrease.(iii)When consumers are indifferent to the two online channels,the manufacturer will distribute high-quality products under both financing modes at high interest rates,more lenient condition under e-commerce financing.(iv)When the financing interest rates of the e-commerce platform and the bank are the same,the manufacturer prefers e-commerce financing for distributing high-quality products,but opts for bank financing when directly selling high-quality products with a significant quality gap.展开更多
基金supported by the Science and Technology Research Program of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission under Grant No.KJQN202401117Humanities and Social Science Youth Project of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission under Grant No.24SKGH228.
文摘This paper examines the optimal decisions on operations and financing modes of a capital-constrained manufacturer selling two different quality levels of products through an online dual-channel.The manufacturer can mitigate financial constrains by leveraging either e-commerce platform financing or bank financing.The Stackelberg game models are established under both financing modes to analyze the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform.Additionally,the study explores the effects of financing interest rates and product quality differences on equilibrium outcomes in the online dual-channel.The findings reveal the following:(i)As financing interest rates increase,total product sales decline.While product prices may rise,this does not necessarily intensify price competition within the online dual-channel.(ii)When the e-commerce platform’s financing rate exceeds the bank rate,the manufacturer sets higher direct sales prices.Beyond a specific threshold,distribution prices rise,and total sales decrease.(iii)When consumers are indifferent to the two online channels,the manufacturer will distribute high-quality products under both financing modes at high interest rates,more lenient condition under e-commerce financing.(iv)When the financing interest rates of the e-commerce platform and the bank are the same,the manufacturer prefers e-commerce financing for distributing high-quality products,but opts for bank financing when directly selling high-quality products with a significant quality gap.
