The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a block...The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a blockchain-enabled manufacturing collaboration framework is proposed,with a focus on the production capacity matching problem for blockchainbased peer-to-peer(P2P)collaboration.First,a digital model of production capacity description is built for trustworthy and transparent sharing over the blockchain.Second,an optimization problem is formulated for P2P production capacity matching with objectives to maximize both social welfare and individual benefits of all participants.Third,a feasible solution based on an iterative double auction mechanism is designed to determine the optimal price and quantity for production capacity matching with a lack of personal information.It facilitates automation of the matching process while protecting users'privacy via blockchainbased smart contracts.Finally,simulation results from the Hyperledger Fabric-based prototype show that the proposed approach increases social welfare by 1.4%compared to the Bayesian game-based approach,makes all participants profitable,and achieves 90%fairness of enterprises.展开更多
Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always cre...Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always credible in practice.Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust,but they ignore the existence of collusion.In this paper,a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme(PPCR)for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology,which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy.A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance.A Dispute Resolution agreement(DR)is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct.In addition,a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol(CDR)is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small,significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution.Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.展开更多
The complexity of cloud environments challenges secure resource management,especially for intrusion detection systems(IDS).Existing strategies struggle to balance efficiency,cost fairness,and threat resilience.This pa...The complexity of cloud environments challenges secure resource management,especially for intrusion detection systems(IDS).Existing strategies struggle to balance efficiency,cost fairness,and threat resilience.This paper proposes an innovative approach to managing cloud resources through the integration of a genetic algorithm(GA)with a“double auction”method.This approach seeks to enhance security and efficiency by aligning buyers and sellers within an intelligent market framework.It guarantees equitable pricing while utilizing resources efficiently and optimizing advantages for all stakeholders.The GA functions as an intelligent search mechanism that identifies optimal combinations of bids from users and suppliers,addressing issues arising from the intricacies of cloud systems.Analyses proved that our method surpasses previous strategies,particularly in terms of price accuracy,speed,and the capacity to manage large-scale activities,critical factors for real-time cybersecurity systems,such as IDS.Our research integrates artificial intelligence-inspired evolutionary algorithms with market-driven methods to develop intelligent resource management systems that are secure,scalable,and adaptable to evolving risks,such as process innovation.展开更多
The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integra...The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integrating TFM initiatives and allocate the limited airspace resources to these airlines equitably and efficiently is still a problem.The air traffic management（ATM）authority aims to minimizing the systemic costs of congested airspaces.And the airlines are self-interested and profit-oriented.Being incorporated into the collaborative decision making（CDM）process,the airlines can influence the rescheduling decisions to profit themselves.The airlines maybe hide the flight information that is disadvantageous to them,but is necessary to the optimal system decision.To realize the coincidence goal between the ATM authority and airlines for the efficient,and equitable allocation of airspace resources,this paper provides an auction-based market method to solve the congestion airspace problem under the pre-tactic and tactic stage of air traffic flow management.Through a simulation experiment,the rationing results show that the auction method can decrease the total delay costs of flights in the congested airspace compared with both the first schedule first service（FSFS）tactic and the ration by schedule（RBS）tactic.Finally,the analysis results indicate that if reallocate the charges from the auction to the airlines according to the proportion of their disrupted flights,the auction mechanism can allocate the airspace resource in economy equitably and decrease the delay losses of the airlines compared with the results of the FSFS tactic.展开更多
Cognitive radio（CR） technology is considered to be an effective solution to allocate spectrum resources,whereas the primary users of a network do not fully utilize available frequency bands.Spectrum auction framewor...Cognitive radio（CR） technology is considered to be an effective solution to allocate spectrum resources,whereas the primary users of a network do not fully utilize available frequency bands.Spectrum auction framework has been recognized as an effective way to achieve dynamic spectrum access.From the perspective of spectrum auction,multi-band multi-user auction provides a new challenge for spectrum management.This paper proposes an auction framework based on location information for multi-band multi-user spectrum allocation.The performance of the proposed framework is compared with that of traditional auction framework based on a binary interference model as a benchmark.Simulation results show that primary users will obtain more total system revenue by selling their idle frequency bands to secondary users and the spectrum utilization of the proposed framework is more effective and fairer.展开更多
We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secu...We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secure multi-user signals. To maximize the secrecy rate of uplink communications, we propose a distributed ascending-clock auction(ACA) algorithm to allocate subcarriers and jamming power. Specifically, the impact of the self-interference of the full-duplex base station on the secrecy rate is considered. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts. Firstly, subcarriers and the jamming power are respectively priced by the base station. Secondly, users select the subcarrier and the jamming power based on the price. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed auction algorithm is mathematically proved. Simulation results show that the proposed auction algorithm is more beneficial to improve the uplink secrecy performance compared to traditional auction algorithms.展开更多
In a SIPV model,when the commission proportion is not certain,but related with bargain price,generally,it is a linear function of the bargain price,this paper gives bidders'equilibrium bidding strategies in the fi...In a SIPV model,when the commission proportion is not certain,but related with bargain price,generally,it is a linear function of the bargain price,this paper gives bidders'equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions.We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies.For seller or auction house,whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function,the size of the fixed commission proportion,but also related with the value of the item auctioned.So,in the practical auctions,the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.展开更多
An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of bad real-time performance or inability to get a global optimal/better solution when applying single-item auction （SIA） method or combinatorial auctio...An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of bad real-time performance or inability to get a global optimal/better solution when applying single-item auction （SIA） method or combinatorial auction method to multi-robot task allocation. The genetic algorithm based combinatorial auction （GACA） method which combines the basic-genetic algorithm with a new concept of ringed chromosome is used to solve the winner determination problem （WDP） of combinatorial auction. The simulation experiments are conducted in OpenSim, a multi-robot simulator. The results show that GACA can get a satisfying solution in a reasonable shot time, and compared with SIA or parthenogenesis algorithm combinatorial auction （PGACA） method, it is the simplest and has higher search efficiency, also, GACA can get a global better/optimal solution and satisfy the high real-time requirement of multi-robot task allocation.展开更多
Recently, an experimentally feasible three-party quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on EPR pairs [Z.Y. Wang, Commun. Theor. Phys. 54 （2010） 997] was proposed. However, this study points out Wang＇s protocol c...Recently, an experimentally feasible three-party quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on EPR pairs [Z.Y. Wang, Commun. Theor. Phys. 54 （2010） 997] was proposed. However, this study points out Wang＇s protocol cannot resist some internal bidders＇ attacks, such as the Twiee-CNOT attack, the collusion attack. A malicious bidder can launch the Twice-CNOT attack to obtain the other＇s bid, or the dishonest auctioneer may collude with one bidder and help him/her win the action by changing his/her bid. For preventing against these attacks, a simple solution by using the QKD-based message encryption and a post-confirmation mechanism by adopting the hash function are proposed.展开更多
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(62273310)the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province of China(LY22F030006,LZ24F030009)
文摘The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a blockchain-enabled manufacturing collaboration framework is proposed,with a focus on the production capacity matching problem for blockchainbased peer-to-peer(P2P)collaboration.First,a digital model of production capacity description is built for trustworthy and transparent sharing over the blockchain.Second,an optimization problem is formulated for P2P production capacity matching with objectives to maximize both social welfare and individual benefits of all participants.Third,a feasible solution based on an iterative double auction mechanism is designed to determine the optimal price and quantity for production capacity matching with a lack of personal information.It facilitates automation of the matching process while protecting users'privacy via blockchainbased smart contracts.Finally,simulation results from the Hyperledger Fabric-based prototype show that the proposed approach increases social welfare by 1.4%compared to the Bayesian game-based approach,makes all participants profitable,and achieves 90%fairness of enterprises.
基金supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (No.2020YFB1005500)the Leading-edge Technology Program of Jiangsu Natural Science Foundation (No.BK20202001)+1 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No.XJSJ23040)the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (No.2021K596C)。
文摘Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always credible in practice.Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust,but they ignore the existence of collusion.In this paper,a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme(PPCR)for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology,which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy.A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance.A Dispute Resolution agreement(DR)is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct.In addition,a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol(CDR)is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small,significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution.Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.
文摘The complexity of cloud environments challenges secure resource management,especially for intrusion detection systems(IDS).Existing strategies struggle to balance efficiency,cost fairness,and threat resilience.This paper proposes an innovative approach to managing cloud resources through the integration of a genetic algorithm(GA)with a“double auction”method.This approach seeks to enhance security and efficiency by aligning buyers and sellers within an intelligent market framework.It guarantees equitable pricing while utilizing resources efficiently and optimizing advantages for all stakeholders.The GA functions as an intelligent search mechanism that identifies optimal combinations of bids from users and suppliers,addressing issues arising from the intricacies of cloud systems.Analyses proved that our method surpasses previous strategies,particularly in terms of price accuracy,speed,and the capacity to manage large-scale activities,critical factors for real-time cybersecurity systems,such as IDS.Our research integrates artificial intelligence-inspired evolutionary algorithms with market-driven methods to develop intelligent resource management systems that are secure,scalable,and adaptable to evolving risks,such as process innovation.
基金Supported by the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China("863"Program)(20060AA12A105)the Chinese Airspace Management Commission Researching Program(GKG200802006)~~
文摘The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integrating TFM initiatives and allocate the limited airspace resources to these airlines equitably and efficiently is still a problem.The air traffic management（ATM）authority aims to minimizing the systemic costs of congested airspaces.And the airlines are self-interested and profit-oriented.Being incorporated into the collaborative decision making（CDM）process,the airlines can influence the rescheduling decisions to profit themselves.The airlines maybe hide the flight information that is disadvantageous to them,but is necessary to the optimal system decision.To realize the coincidence goal between the ATM authority and airlines for the efficient,and equitable allocation of airspace resources,this paper provides an auction-based market method to solve the congestion airspace problem under the pre-tactic and tactic stage of air traffic flow management.Through a simulation experiment,the rationing results show that the auction method can decrease the total delay costs of flights in the congested airspace compared with both the first schedule first service（FSFS）tactic and the ration by schedule（RBS）tactic.Finally,the analysis results indicate that if reallocate the charges from the auction to the airlines according to the proportion of their disrupted flights,the auction mechanism can allocate the airspace resource in economy equitably and decrease the delay losses of the airlines compared with the results of the FSFS tactic.
基金supported by the Beijing Natural Science Foundation of China (4102050)
文摘Cognitive radio（CR） technology is considered to be an effective solution to allocate spectrum resources,whereas the primary users of a network do not fully utilize available frequency bands.Spectrum auction framework has been recognized as an effective way to achieve dynamic spectrum access.From the perspective of spectrum auction,multi-band multi-user auction provides a new challenge for spectrum management.This paper proposes an auction framework based on location information for multi-band multi-user spectrum allocation.The performance of the proposed framework is compared with that of traditional auction framework based on a binary interference model as a benchmark.Simulation results show that primary users will obtain more total system revenue by selling their idle frequency bands to secondary users and the spectrum utilization of the proposed framework is more effective and fairer.
基金supported in part by National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program)under Grant No.SS2015AA011306National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program)under Grant No.2014AA01A701National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants No.61379006 and 61521003
文摘We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secure multi-user signals. To maximize the secrecy rate of uplink communications, we propose a distributed ascending-clock auction(ACA) algorithm to allocate subcarriers and jamming power. Specifically, the impact of the self-interference of the full-duplex base station on the secrecy rate is considered. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts. Firstly, subcarriers and the jamming power are respectively priced by the base station. Secondly, users select the subcarrier and the jamming power based on the price. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed auction algorithm is mathematically proved. Simulation results show that the proposed auction algorithm is more beneficial to improve the uplink secrecy performance compared to traditional auction algorithms.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foun-dation of China(70071012)
文摘In a SIPV model,when the commission proportion is not certain,but related with bargain price,generally,it is a linear function of the bargain price,this paper gives bidders'equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions.We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies.For seller or auction house,whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function,the size of the fixed commission proportion,but also related with the value of the item auctioned.So,in the practical auctions,the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.
基金Sponsored by Excellent Young Scholars Research Fund of Beijing Institute of Technology(00Y03-13)
文摘An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of bad real-time performance or inability to get a global optimal/better solution when applying single-item auction （SIA） method or combinatorial auction method to multi-robot task allocation. The genetic algorithm based combinatorial auction （GACA） method which combines the basic-genetic algorithm with a new concept of ringed chromosome is used to solve the winner determination problem （WDP） of combinatorial auction. The simulation experiments are conducted in OpenSim, a multi-robot simulator. The results show that GACA can get a satisfying solution in a reasonable shot time, and compared with SIA or parthenogenesis algorithm combinatorial auction （PGACA） method, it is the simplest and has higher search efficiency, also, GACA can get a global better/optimal solution and satisfy the high real-time requirement of multi-robot task allocation.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.61103235,61170321,and 61373131the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions(PAPD)+1 种基金the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province,China(BK2010570)State Key Laboratory of Software Engineering,Wuhan University(SKLSE2012-09-41)
文摘Recently, an experimentally feasible three-party quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on EPR pairs [Z.Y. Wang, Commun. Theor. Phys. 54 （2010） 997] was proposed. However, this study points out Wang＇s protocol cannot resist some internal bidders＇ attacks, such as the Twiee-CNOT attack, the collusion attack. A malicious bidder can launch the Twice-CNOT attack to obtain the other＇s bid, or the dishonest auctioneer may collude with one bidder and help him/her win the action by changing his/her bid. For preventing against these attacks, a simple solution by using the QKD-based message encryption and a post-confirmation mechanism by adopting the hash function are proposed.
