In this paper,we study atomic dynamic routing games with multiple destinations.We first show that if the first-in–first-out(FIFO)principle is always fulfilled locally to regulate the congestion,then most probably we ...In this paper,we study atomic dynamic routing games with multiple destinations.We first show that if the first-in–first-out(FIFO)principle is always fulfilled locally to regulate the congestion,then most probably we cannot guarantee the existence of any reasonable approximate Nash equilibrium.By partly discarding the FIFO principle and introducing destination priorities in the regulation rules,we propose a new atomic routing model.In each such game,we prove that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists and can be computed in polynomial time.In addition,the multicommodity routing game can be iteratively decomposed into a series of well-behaved single-destination routing games,which will provide a good characterization of all NEs of the original game.展开更多
基金supported partly by National Key R&D Program of China(Nos.2021YFA1000300 and 2021YFA1000301)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.11971046).
文摘In this paper,we study atomic dynamic routing games with multiple destinations.We first show that if the first-in–first-out(FIFO)principle is always fulfilled locally to regulate the congestion,then most probably we cannot guarantee the existence of any reasonable approximate Nash equilibrium.By partly discarding the FIFO principle and introducing destination priorities in the regulation rules,we propose a new atomic routing model.In each such game,we prove that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists and can be computed in polynomial time.In addition,the multicommodity routing game can be iteratively decomposed into a series of well-behaved single-destination routing games,which will provide a good characterization of all NEs of the original game.
